Safe Testing by Grünwald, Peter et al.
Safe Testing
Peter Grünwald1, Rianne de Heide2, and Wouter M. Koolen3
1,2,3Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
1,2Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
1,2,3 {pdg, heide, wmkoolen}@cwi.nl
June 11, 2020
Abstract
We develop the theory of hypothesis testing based on the e-value, a notion of evidence
that, unlike the p-value, allows for effortlessly combining results from several tests. Even
in the common scenario of optional continuation, where the decision to perform a new test
depends on previous test outcomes, ‘safe’ tests based on e-values generally preserve Type-I
error guarantees. Our main result shows that e-values exist for completely general testing
problems with composite null and alternatives. Their prime interpretation is in terms of
gambling or investing, each e-value corresponding to a particular investment. Surprisingly,
optimal “GROW” e-values, which lead to fastest capital growth, are fully characterized by
the joint information projection (JIPr) between the set of all Bayes marginal distributions
on H0 and H1. Thus, optimal e-values also have an interpretation as Bayes factors, with
priors given by the JIPr. We illustrate the theory using several ‘classic’ examples including
a one-sample safe t-test and the 2 × 2 contingency table. Sharing Fisherian, Neymanian
and Jeffreys-Bayesian interpretations, e-values and safe tests may provide a methodology
acceptable to adherents of all three schools.
1 Introduction and Overview
We wish to test the veracity of a null hypothesis H0, often in contrast with some alternative
hypothesis H1, where both H0 and H1 represent sets of distributions on some given sample
space. Our theory is based on e-test statistics. These are simply nonnegative random variables
that satisfy the inequality:
for all P ∈ H0: EP [E] ≤ 1. (1)
We refer to e-test statistics as e-variables, and to the value they take on a given sample as the
e-value, emphasizing that they are to be viewed as an alternative to, and in many cases an
improvement of, the classical p-value. Note that large e-values correspond to evidence against
the null: for given e-variable E and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, we define the threshold test corresponding to
E with significance level α, as the test that rejects H0 iff E ≥ 1/α. We will see, in a sense to
be defined, that this test is safe under optional continuation, which for brevity we will simply
call “safe”.
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Motivation p-values and standard null hypothesis testing have come under intense scrutiny
in recent years (Wasserstein et al., 2016, Benjamin et al., 2018). e-variables and safe tests offer
several advantages. Most importantly, in contrast to p-values, e-variables behave excellently
under optional continuation, the highly common practice in which the decision to perform
additional tests partly depends on the outcome of previous tests; they thus seem particularly
promising when used in meta-analysis, avoiding the issue of ‘accumulation bias’ (ter Schure
and Grünwald, 2019). A second reason is their enhanced interpretability, and a third is their
flexibility: e-variables based on Fisherian, Neyman-Pearsonian and Bayes-Jeffreys’ testing
philosophies all can be accommodated for. These three types of e-variables can be freely
combined, while preserving Type I error guarantees; at the same time, they keep a clear
(monetary) interpretation even if one dismisses ‘significance’ altogether, as recently advocated
by Amrhein et al. (2019).
Contribution Our aim is to lay out the full theory of testing based on e-variables, both
methodologically and mathematically. Methodologically, we explain the advantages that e-
variables and safe tests offer over traditional tests, p-values and (some) Bayes factors; we
introduce the GROW criterion defining optimal e-variables and provide specific (‘simple δ-
GROW’) e-variables that are well-behaved in terms of GROW and power, and easy to use in
practice. Mathematically, we show (Theorem 1) that, for arbitrary composite, nonconvex H0
and H1, we can construct nontrivial e-variables. In many cases, (Theorem 1 and 3) we can
even construct e-variables that are optimal in the strong GROW sense. e-variables have been
invented independently by (at least) Levin (1976), Zhang et al. (2011) and have been analyzed
before by Shafer et al. (2011), Shafer and Vovk (2019) and Vovk and Wang (2019), who
emphasize that they can also be much more easilymerged than p-values. They are close cousins
of test martingales (Shafer et al., 2011) which themselves underlie AV (anytime-valid) p-values
(Johari et al., 2015), AV tests and AV confidence sequences (Balsubramani and Ramdas, 2016,
Howard et al., 2018a,b). As such, our methodological insights are mostly variations of existing
ideas; yet, they have never before been worked out in full. The mathematical results Theorem 1
and Theorem 3 are new, although a special case of Theorem 1 was shown earlier by (Zhang
et al., 2011); see Section 6 for more on novelty and related work.
Contents In this introductory section, we give an overview of the main ideas: Section 1.1
provides three interpretations of e-variables and the idea of optional continuation. In Sec-
tion 1.2, we discuss the GROW optimality theorem, and the use of our Theorem 1 to find
‘good’ Bayesian and/or GROW e-variables. Section 1.3 gives a first, extended example. The
remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains how some e-value based
tests are not merely safe under optional continuation, but also under the more well-known
optional stopping, and explains the close relation between test martingales and e-variables.
Section 3 gives our first main result, Theorem 1. Section 4 gives several examples, and Sec-
tion 5 reports some preliminary experiments. The paper ends with a section providing more
historical context and an overview of related work in Section 6 — including a discussion that
clarifies how testing based on e-values could provide a unification of Fisher’s, Neyman’s and
Jeffreys’ ideas. All longer proofs are delegated to the appendices, which start with Appendix A
providing details about (standard but tacit) assumptions and notations from the main text.
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1.1 The three main interpretations of e-variables
1. First Interpretation: Gambling The first and foremost interpretation of e-variables
is in terms of money, or, more precisely, Kelly (1956) gambling . Imagine a ticket (contract,
gamble, investment) that one can buy for 1$, and that, after realization of the data, pays
E $; one may buy several and positive fractional amounts of tickets. (1) says that, if the null
hypothesis is true, then one expects not to gain any money by buying such tickets: for any
r ∈ R+, upon buying r tickets one expects to end up with rE[E] ≤ r $. Therefore, if the
observed value of E is large, say 20, one would have gained a lot of money after all, indicating
that something might be wrong about the null.
2. Second Interpretation: Conservative p-Value, Type I Error Probability Recall
that a (strict) p-value is a random variable P such that for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, all P0 ∈ H0,
P0(P ≤ α) = α. (2)
A conservative p-value is a random variable for which (2) holds with ‘=’ replaced by ‘≤’.
There is a close connection between (small) p- and (large) e-values:
Proposition 1. For any given e-variable E, define P[e] := 1/E. Then P[e] is a conservative
p-value. As a consequence, for every e-variable E, any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the corresponding threshold-
based test has Type-I error guarantee α, i.e. for all P ∈ H0,
P (E ≥ 1/α) ≤ α. (3)
Proof. (of Proposition 1) Markov’s inequality gives P (E ≥ α−1) ≤ αEP [E] ≤ α.
While e-variables are thus conservative p-values, standard p-values satisfying (2) are by no
means e-variables; if E is an e-variable and P is a standard p-value, and they are calculated
on the same data, then we will usually observe P  1/E so E gives less evidence against the
null; Section 1.3 and Section 6 will give some idea of the ratio between 1/E and P in various
practical settings.
Combining 1. and 2.: Optional Continuation, GROW Propositions 2, 3 below show
that multiplying e-variables E(1), E(2), . . . for tests based on respective samples Y(1), Y(2), . . .
(with each Y(j) being the vector of outcomes for the j-th test), gives rise to new e-variables,
even if the decision whether or not to perform the test resulting in E(j) was based on the value
of earlier test outcomes E(j−1), E(j−2), . . .. As a result (Prop. 2), the Type I-Error Guarantee
(3) remains valid even under this ‘optional continuation’ of testing. An informal ‘proof’ is
immediate from our gambling interpretation: if we start by investing $1 in E(1) and, after
observing E(1), reinvest all our new capital $E(1) into E(2), then after observing E(2) our new
capital will obviously be $E(1) ·E(2), and so on. If, under the null, we do not expect to gain any
money for any of the individual gambles E(j), then, intuitively, we should not expect to gain
any money under whichever strategy we employ for deciding whether or not to reinvest (just
as you would not expect to gain any money in a casino irrespective of your rule for re-investing
and/or stopping and going home).
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3. Third Interpretation: Bayes Factors For convenience, from now on we write the
models H0 and H1 as
H0 = {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ0} ; H1 = {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ1},
where for θ ∈ Θ0 ∪ Θ1, the Pθ are all probability distributions on the same sample, all have
probability densities or mass functions, denoted as pθ, and we assume the parameterization
is 1-to-1 (see Appendix A for more details). Suppose that Y = (Y1, . . . , YN ), a vector of N
outcomes, represents our data. N may be a fixed sample size n but can also be a random
stopping time. In the Bayes factor approach to testing, one associates bothHj with a prior Wj ,
which is simply a probability distribution on Θj , and a Bayes marginal probability distribution
PWj , with density (or mass) function given by
pWj (Y) :=
∫
Θj
pθ(Y) dWj(θ). (4)
The Bayes factor is then given as:
BF :=
pW1(Y)
pW0(Y)
. (5)
Whenever H0 = {P0} is simple, i.e., a singleton, then the Bayes factor is also an e-variable,
since in that case, we must have that W0 is degenerate, putting all mass on 0, and pW0 = p0,
and then for all P ∈ H0, i.e. for P0, we have
EP [BF] :=
∫
p0(y) · pW1(y)
p0(y)
dy = 1. (6)
For such e-variables that are really simple-H0-based Bayes factors, Proposition 1 reduces to the
well-known universal bound for likelihood ratios (Royall, 1997). When H0 is itself composite,
most Bayes factors BF = pW1/pW0 will not be e-variables any more, since for B to be an e-
variable we require (6) to hold for all Pθ, θ ∈ Θ0, whereas in general it only holds for P = PW0 .
Nevertheless, our Theorem 1 implies that there always exist many special combinations of W0
andW1, for which B = pW1/pW0 is an e-variable after all, and that optimal e-values invariably
take on a Bayesian form (though sometimes with unusual priors).
1.2 How to find Good e-Values
1. (Semi-) Bayesian Approach Suppose we take a Bayesian stance regarding H1 and,
conditioned on H1, are prepared to represent our uncertainty by prior distribution W1 on Θ1.
Suppose that the set of all probability distributionsW(Θ0) that one can define on Θ0, contains
a prior W ◦0 that minimizes the KL divergence D(PW1‖PW ◦0 ) = minW0∈W(Θ0)D(PW1‖PW0) to
PW1 . Following Barron and Li (1999), we call P ◦W0 the Reverse Information Projection (RIPr)
of PW1 on P(Θ0) = {PW0 : W0 ∈ W(Θ0)}. Parts 1 and 2 of our main result Theorem 1
essentially state the following:
Corollary of Theorem 1 Let W1 be any prior on Θ1 and let PW ◦0 be the RIPr of PW1 onP(Θ0). Then the Bayes factor e∗W1 := pW1(Y)/pW ◦0 (Y) is an e-variable.
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The RIPr idea can be extended to the case that the minimum minW0∈W(Θ0)D(PW1‖PW0)
is not achieved, and the theorem provides a W1-based e-variable for that case as well. We can
thus be fully Bayesian about H1, but any prior W1 on H1 that we wish to adopt forces us to
adopt a corresponding prior W ◦0 ∈ H0. In general this may feel ‘un-Bayesian’, but one may
perhaps consider it a small price to pay for creating a Bayes factor that should be acceptable
to frequentists as well — for the test corresponding to E∗W1 will preserve Type-I error bounds
under optional continuation under all P0 ∈ H0, no matter the prior W1 one chose. Moreover,
in the standard case that the models are nested and H0 is a sub-model of H1, it is generally
recognized that the priors onH0 andH1 should somehow be ‘matched’ with each other (Berger
et al., 1998); we may view the RIPr construction as providing just such a matching.
2. Frequentist (GROW) Approach We return to the monetary interpretation of e-
values. The definition of e-variable ensures that we expect them to stay under 1 (one does
not gain money) under any P ∈ H0. Analogously, one would like them to be constructed
such that they can be expected to grow large as fast as possible (one gets rich, gets evidence
against H0) under all P ∈ H1. Informally, e-variables with this property are called GROW. In
its simplest form, for H0 and H1 that are strictly separated, the GROW (growth-rate optimal
in worst-case) criterion tells us to pick, among all e-variables relative to H0, the one that
maximizes expected capital growth rate under H1 in the worst case, i.e. the e-variable E∗ that
achieves
max
E:E is an e-variable
min
P∈H1
EP [logE] (7)
We give five reasons for using the logarithm rather than any other increasing function (such
as the identity) in Section 3.1. Briefly, when we keep using e-variables with additional data
batches as explained in Section 2 below, then optimizing for logE ensures that our capital
grows at the fastest rate. Optimality in terms of GROW may be viewed as an analogue of the
classical frequentist concept of power.
Part 3 of Theorem 1 expresses that, under regularity conditions, the GROW e-variable
is once again a Bayes factor; remarkably, it is the Bayes factor between the Bayes marginals
(P ∗W1 , P
∗
W0
) that form the joint information projection (JIPr), i.e. that are, among all Bayes
marginals indexed by W(Θ0) and W ′1, the closest in KL divergence (Figure 1). By joint
convexity of the KL divergence (Van Erven and Harremoës, 2014), finding the JIPr pair is
thus a convex optimization problem, tending to be computationally feasible.
3. δ-GROW e-values In Section 3.3 we consider the case that H0 and H1 are neither
separated nor do we have prior(s) on H1 available. We can often parameterize the models
as Θ0 = {(0, γ) : γ ∈ Γ} and Θ1 = {(δ, γ) : δ ∈ ∆, γ ∈ Γ} where δ is a single scalar
parameter of interest. We can then define δ-GROW e-variables that are GROW relative to
some suitable H′1 = {P(δ,γ) : γ ∈ Γ, δ ∈ ∆, |δ| ≥ δ}. The development is analogous to the
classical development of tests that have either maximal power under a minimal relevant effect
size, or that have a uniformly most powerful property; and the resulting δ-GROW e-variables
will also have reasonable properties in terms of power. δ-GROW e-variables are again Bayes
factors. Often the δ-GROW e-variable is simple in that it sets W ∗1 to be a degenerate prior,
putting all its marginal mass on ∆ on a single δ (for a one-sided test) or on {−δ, δ} (two-sided).
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PW ∗0
P ∗W1
P(Θ1)
P(Θ(δ))P(Θ0)
Figure 1: The Joint Information Projection (JIPr), with notation from Section 3. Θ0 ⊂ Θ1
represent two nested models, Θ(δ) is a restricted subset of Θ1 that does not overlap with Θ0.
P(Θ) = {PW : W ∈ W(Θ)}, and W(Θ) is the set of all priors over Θ, so P(Θ) is the set
of all Bayes marginals with priors on Θ. Theorem 1 says that the GROW e-variable E∗Θ1(δ)
between Θ0 and Θ1(δ) is given by E∗Θ1(δ) = PW ∗1 /PW ∗0 , the Bayes factor between the two Bayes
marginals that minimize KL divergence D(PW1‖PW0)}.
If H1 is a one-dimensional exponential family, then δ-GROW e-values can be connected to
the uniformly most powerful Bayes factors of Johnson (2013b).
4. Robust Bayesian view of Theorem 1 We may think of the previous Bayesian RIPr
result as a special case of the JIPr result: if H1 is composite, we can ‘collapse’ it into a single
distribution by adopting a prior W1 on Θ1 of our choice and re-defining H1 to be the singleton
H′1 = {PW1}. We are then in the setting of Figure 1 but with H1 a singleton, and the JIPr
becomes the RIPr. The e-variable E∗W ◦0 = pW1/pW ◦0 can thus be thought of as the GROW
e-variable relative to H′1.
More generally, we may only be able to specify a prior distribution on some, but not all
of the parameters. For example, in Bayesian testing with nuisance parameters satisfying a
group invariance as proposed by Berger et al. (1998) one would like to specify a prior W [δ] on
the effect size (non-nuisance) parameter δ but make no assumptions at all about the nuisance
parameter vector γ (a special case is the Bayesian t-test, with γ representing variance). This
is an instance of a ‘robust Bayesian’ approach (Grünwald and Dawid, 2004) in which prior
knowledge is encoded as a set of priors (in this instance, it would be the set of all priors on
(δ, γ) whose marginal on δ coincides with W [δ]). Our Theorem 1 continues to apply in this
setting. Rather than a full model H1 as under 2. above, or a single prior W1 as under 1.
above, we may replace the minimum over P ∈ H1 in (7) by a minimum over W ∈ W ′1 over any
convex set of priors W ′1 on Θ1, minP∈H1 EP [. . .] becoming minW∈W ′1 EPW [. . .]. For essentially
any such W ′1, our Theorem 1 still holds. This high level of generality is needed, for example,
in our treatment of the 1-sample t-test. For this we formally show (in our second main result,
Theorem 3, which enables us to use Theorem 1) that the Bayes factor based on the improper
right Haar prior, advocated by Berger et al. (1998), has a GROW property.
5. Examples and Experiments We work out simple δ-GROW e-variables for several stan-
dard settings: 1-dimensional exponential families, nonparametric tests such as Mann-Whitney,
2×2 contingency tables and the setting of the 1-sample t-test, each time applying Theorem 1 to
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show that the resulting e-variable is GROW. We also provide ‘quick and dirty’ (non-GROW)
e-variables for the case that H0 is a general multivariate exponential family. Specifically we
show that Bayes factors equiped with the right Haar prior on nuisance parameters provide
e-variables, despite the prior being improper. The Bayesian t-test with a standard (nondegen-
erate) priorW [δ] on δ thus gives an S-variable, but it is not δ-GROW in our sense. We present
a δ-GROW version of the Bayesian t-test that has significantly better properties in terms of
statistical power than the standard versions. We provide a preliminary experiment suggesting
that with δ-GROW e-variables, if data comes from H1 rather than H0, one needs less data
to find out than with standard Bayes factor tests, but a bit more data than with standard
frequentist tests. However, in the t-test setting the effective amount of data needed is about
the same as with the standard frequentist t-test because, in this setting, one is allowed to do
optional stopping.
1.3 A First Example: the Gaussian Location Family
Let H0 express that the Yi are i.i.d. ∼ N(0, 1). According to H1, the Yi are i.i.d. ∼ N(µ, 1)
for some µ ∈ Θ1 = R. We perform a first test on initial sample Y := Y n := (Y1, . . . , Yn). We
consider a standard Bayes factor test for this scenario, equiping Θ1 with a prior W that for
simplicity we take to be normal with variance 1, so that W has density w(µ) ∝ exp(−µ2/2).
The Bayes factor is given by
E(1) :=
pW (Y)
p0(Y)
=
∫
µ∈R pµ(Y)w(µ)dµ
p0(Y)
, (8)
where pµ(Y) = pµ(Y1, . . . , Yn) ∝ exp(−
∑n
i=1(Yi − µ)2/2); by (6) we know that E(1) is an
e-value. By straightforward calculation:
logE = −1
2
log(n+ 1) +
1
2
(n+ 1) · µ˘2n,
where µ˘n = (
∑
i=1 Yi)/(n + 1) is the Bayes MAP estimator, which only differs from the ML
estimator by O(1/n2): µ˘n− µˆn = µˆn/(n(n+1)). If we were to reject Θ0 when E ≥ 20 (giving,
by Proposition 1 a Type-I error guarantee of 0.05), we would thus reject if
|µ˘n| ≥
√
5.99 + log(n+ 1)
n+ 1
, i.e. |µˆn| 
√
(log n)/n,
where we used 2 log 20 ≈ 5.99. Contrast this with the standard Neyman-Pearson (NP)
test, which would reject (α ≤ 0.05) if |µˆn| ≥ 1.96/
√
n. The δ-GROW e-variables for
this problem that we describe in Section 4.1 can be chosen so as to guarantee E∗ ≥ 20 if
|µˆn| ≥ µ˜n with µ˜n = cn/
√
n where cn > 0 is increasing and converges exponentially fast to√
2 log 40 ≈ 2.72. Thus, while the NP test itself defines an e-variable that scores infinitely bad
on our GROW optimality criterion (Example 1), we can choose a GROW E∗ that is qualita-
tively more similar to a standard NP test than a standard Bayes factor approach. For general
1-dimensional exponential families, this δ-GROW E∗ coincides with a 2-sided version of John-
son’s (2013b, 2013a) uniformly most powerful Bayes test, which uses a discrete priorW within
H1: for the normal location family, W ({µ˜n}) = W ({−µ˜n}) = 1/2 with µ˜n as above. Since the
prior depends on n, some statisticians would perhaps not really view this as ‘Bayesian’; and
we also think of such δ-GROW e-variables, despite their formally Bayesian form, as having
firstly a frequentist motivation.
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Optional Continuation: Compatibility with Bayesian Updating For arbitrary prior
W on Θ1, define en,W = pW (Y n)/p0(Y n) to be the Bayes factor with prior W for Θ1 applied
to data Y n. The Bayesian e-variable (8) can then be written as E(1) = eN(1),W(1)(Y(1)), with
N(1) = n, Y(1) = Y = Y n. Suppose we have adopted some inital prior W(1) (say a normal
with variance 1), and initial observed data Y(1) = Y n, leading to a first e-value E(1) = 18 —
promising enough for us to invest our resources into a subsequent trial. We decide to gather
N(2) data points leading to data Y(2) = (YN(1)+1, . . . , YN(2)). We decide to use the following
e-variable for this second data batch:
E(2) := eN(2),W(2)
(
Y(2)
)
:=
pW(2)
(
Y(2)
)
p0
(
Y(2)
) ,
for a new prior W(2). Crucially, we are allowed to choose both N(2) and W(2) as a function of
past data Y(1). To see that E(2) gives an e-variable, note that, no matter how we chooseW(2),
EY(2)∼P0 [E(2)] = 1, by a calculation analogous to (6). If we want to stick to the Bayesian
paradigm, we can choose W(2) := W(1)(· | Y(1)), i.e. W(2) is the Bayes posterior for µ based on
data Y(1) and prior W(1). A simple calculation using Bayes’ theorem shows that multiplying
E(2) := E(1) · E(2) (which gives a new e-variable by Proposition 2), satisfies
E(2) = E(1) · E(2) =
pW(1)(Y(1)) · pW(1)(·|Y(1))(Y(2))
p0(Y(2))
=
pW(1)(Y1, . . . , YN(2))
p0(Y1, . . . , YN(2))
, (9)
which is exactly what one would get by Bayesian updating. This illustrates that, for simple
H0, combining e-variables by multiplication can be done consistently with Bayesian updating
if the e-variables are based on Bayes factors with prior on H1 given by the posterior based on
past data. To be precise, if, in Proposition 2 below, one takes as function g(Y) := W(1) | Y,
then the resulting products E(k) =
∏k
j=1E(j), k = 1, 2, . . . precisely correspond to the Bayes
factors based on prior W(1) after observing data Y1, . . . ,Y(k).
Optional Continuation: Beyond Bayesian Updating However, it might also be the
case that it is not us who get the additional funding to obtain extra data, but rather some
research group at a different location. If the question is, say, whether a medication works, the
null hypothesis would still be that µ = 0 but, if it works, its effectiveness might be slightly
different due to slight differences in population. In that case, the research group might decide
to use a different test statistic E′(2) which is again a Bayes factor, but now with an alternative
prior W on µ (for example, the original prior W(1) might be re-used rather than replaced
by W(1)(· | Y(1)). Even though this would not be standard Bayesian, E(1) · E′(2) would still
be a valid e-variable, and Type-I error guarantees would still be preserved — and the same
would hold even if the new research group would use an entirely different prior on Θ1. It
is also conceivable that the group performing the first trial was happy to adopt a Bayesian
stance, adopting the normal prior W(1), whereas the second group was frequentist, adopting a
δ-GROW e-variable satisfying E∗(2) ≥ 20 if |µˆ(Y(2)| ' 2.72/
√
n, with µˆ(Y(2) the MLE based
on the second sample. Still, basing decisions on the product E∗(1) ·E∗(2) preserves Type-I error
probability bounds. And, after the second batch of data Y(2), one might consider obtaining a
third sample, or even more samples, each time using a different W(k), that is always allowed
to depend on the past. In the next section we show how multiplying e-variables against such
an arbitrarily long sequence of trials always preserves Type-I error bounds.
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Beyond the Normal Location Family Full compatibility of our approach with Bayesian
updating remains possible for all testing problems with simple H0. If H0 becomes composite,
it cannot always be ensured: while we may still choose prior W(2) on Θ1 to be the Bayes
posterior based on Y(1), the corresponding prior on Θ0 to be used in the second batch of data
may in general not be equal to the posterior on Θ0 based on Y(1).
2 Optional Continuation
Suppose we have available a collection E = ⋃n≥1 En, with En = {en,W : W ∈ W}, where for
each n and W ∈ Wn, en,W defines a nonnegative test statistic for data Y n = (Y1, . . . , Yn)
of length n: it is a function from Yn to R+0 . We are mostly interested in the case that E
really represents a collection of e-variables, so that for all n,W ∈ W, E := en,W (Y n) is an
e-variable. For example, we could take en,w to be the e-variable in the example of Section 1.3,
which depends on the prior W , each different prior leading to a different valid definition of
E = en,W (Y). More generally though, the en,W may not always have a direct Bayesian
interpretation.
We observe a first sample (e.g., data of a first clinical trial), Y(1) = Y N(1) = (Y1, . . . , YN(1)),
and measure our first test statistic E(1) based on Y(1). That is, E(1) = EN(1),W(1)(Y(1)) for
some function EN(1),W(1) ∈ EN(1) . Then, if either the value of E(1) or, more generally of the
underlying data Y(1) is such that we (or some other research group) would like to continue
testing, a second data sample Y(2) = (YN(1)+1, . . . , Yτ(2)) is obtained (e.g. a second clinical trial
is done), and a test statistic E(2) based on data Y(2) is measured. Here τ(2) := N(1) + N(2),
where N(2) is the size of the second sample. We may choose E(2) to be any member from
the set E , and N(2) to be any sample size. As illustrated by the example in Section 1.3, the
particular choice we make may itself depend on Y(1). This means that N(2) and E(2) are
determined via two functions g :
⋃
n≥0 Yn → W ∪ {stop} and h :
⋃
n≥0 Yn → N where, for
any data Y(1), g determines W(2), and h determines N(2), so that together they determine
the next e-variable to be used. After observing Y(2), depending again on the value of Y(2), a
decision is made either to continue to a third test, or to stop testing for the phenomenon under
consideration. In this way we go on until either we decide to stop or until some maximum
number kmax tests have been performed.
The decision whether to stop after k tests or to continue, and if so, what test statistic to
use at the k + 1-st test, is conveniently encoded into g. Thus, g(Y(k)) = stop means that
the k-th test was the final one to be performed. N(k), the size of the k-th batch of data,
and τ(k) :=
∑k
j=1N(j), the total sample size after k batches are determined as follows: we set
N(k) := h(Y
(k−1)), where Y(k) := (Y(1), . . . ,Y(k)), and Y(k) := (Yτ(k−1)+1, . . . , Yτ(k)), where
we set τ(0) := 0. With this notation, Y 0 = Y(0) is an ‘empty sample’ and N(1) := h(Y 0) is a
data-independent sample size for the first data batch; for convenience we also set E(0) := 1.
E(k), the k-th test statistic to be used is similarly determined via W(k) := g(Y(k−1)) and then
E(k) := eN(k),W(k)(Y(k)). With Y1, Y2, . . . arriving sequentially, we can recursively use g to first
determine N(1) and E(1); we can then use g(Y(1)) to determine N(2), τ(2) and E(2); we then
use g(Y(2)) to determine N(3), τ(3) and E(3), and so on, until g(Y(k)) = stop.
Before presenting definitions and results, we generalize the setting to allow us to deal
with optional continuation rules that may be restricted (as needed for e.g. the Bayesian t-test
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(Section 4.3) and with data Y1, Y2, . . . that are not i.i.d. according to all Pθ. For simple i.i.d
testing problems, one may simply set Vn = Yn everywhere for all n below, and skip directly to
Definition 1 and Proposition 2, ignoring the word ‘conditional’ in all that follows.
For the general case, we fix a sequence of random variables V1, V2, . . . such that for each n,
Vn takes values in a set Vn, and there is a function vn such that Vn = vn(Y n). We call each
Vn a coarsening of Y n and, borrowing terminology from measure theory, we call the process
V1, V2, . . . a filtration of Y 1, Y 2, . . .. We now let E〈(Vi)〉 =
⋃
n>0,m≥0 En|m with En|m = {en|m,W }
where en|m,W are functions of V n+m, parameterized not just by the sample size n of samples
to which they are to be applied but also by the sample size m of the past sample, after which
they are applied. We call such a conditional test statistic E := en|m,W (V n+m) an e-variable
conditional on V m relative to filtration (Vi)i∈N if
for all P ∈ H0: EP [E | V m] ≤ 1. (10)
We change the definition of the function g above by replacing all occurrences of the letter Y
with the corresponding instance of the letter V , and with now E(k) := eN(k)|τ(k−1),W(k)(Y(k)).
Definition 1. Let Kstop ≥ 0 to be the smallest k for which g
(
V(k)
)
= stop, and Kstop =
kmax if no such k exists. Let E〈(Vi)〉 be a collection of nonnegative conditional test statistics as
above, defined relative to some filtration (Vi)i∈N of (Yi)i∈N. We say that the threshold test based
on S is safe under optional continuation (for Type-I error probability, under multiplication)
for continuation rules based on (Vi), if for every g as above, with E(k) :=
∏k
j=1E(j), for all
P0 ∈ H0, for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
P0
(
E(Kstop) ≥ α−1
)
≤ α, (11)
i.e. the α-Type-I error probability bound is preserved under any optional continuation rule.
Henceforth we simply omit ‘for Type-I error, under multiplication’ from our descriptions.
If for all n, Vn = Yn, then we simply write ‘safe under optional continuation’.
A threshold test being safe under optional continuation implies that (11) even holds for
the most aggressive continuation rule h which continues until the first K is reached such that
either
∏K
k=1E(k) ≥ α−1 or K = kmax. Thus, safety under optional continuation implies that
under all P0 ∈ H0, the probability that there is any k ≤ kmax such that E(k) ≥ 1/α is bounded
by α. We can now present our optional continuation result in its most basic form:
Proposition 2. Take any (Vi)i∈N as above. If all elements of E are conditional e-variables
as in (10), then E(Kstop) is an e-variable, so that by Proposition 1, the threshold test based on
E(Kstop) is safe under optional continuation for all continuation rules based on (Vi).
The proposition gives the prime motivation for the use of e-variables and verifies the claim
made in the introduction: the product of e-variables remains an e-variable, even if the decision
to observe additional data and record a new e-variable depends on previous outcomes. As a
consequence, Type-I error guarantees still hold for the combined (multiplied) test outcome.
The definition of safety requires Type-I error probabilities to be preserved under arbitrary
functions g, yet a threshold test based on E(Kstop) can be applied without knowing the “off-
sample” details of the actual function g that was used: we only need to know, for each k, once
we are at the end of the k-th trial, the value of g(Y (k)). Thus, crucially, we can apply such tests,
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and have Type-I error guarantees without knowing any other detail of the functions that have
actually been (implicitly, or unconsciously) used. For example, suppose that we continued to a
second sample Y(2) because the data looked promising, say we observed a p-value P based on
Y(1) equal to 0.02. We may not really know whether we would also have continued to gather
a second sample if we had observed P = 0.04 — but it does not matter, because irrespective
of whether a function g was used that continues if P (Y(1)) ∈ [0.01, 0.03] or a function that
continues if P (Y(1)) ∈ [0.005, 0.04], or any other g (e.g. based on E(1) instead of a p-value),
safety under optional continuation guarantees that our Type-I error guarantee is preserved —
even without us knowing such details concerning g.
A heuristic proof of Proposition 2 has already been given in the beginning of this paper: the
statement is essentially equivalent to ‘no matter what your role is for stopping and going home,
you cannot expect to win in a real casino’. We give an explicit elementary proof in Appendix B.
There we also generalize Proposition 2 in various ways: we include the conditional case where
each Pθ defines a conditional distribution for Y n given covariate information Xn and we allow
the sample size of the j-th sample Y(j) to be not fixed in advance but itself determined by
some stopping rule. Finally, we also allow the decision whether or not to perform a new test
to depend on (nonstochastic) side-information such as ‘there is sufficient money to perform an
additional trial with 50 subjects’.
2.1 e-values vs. Test Martingales; Optional Continuation vs. Stopping
The purpose of this section is two-fold: this paper is about ‘safe testing’ — not just under
optional continuation, but also under optional stopping, which we therefore must discuss.
Second, the prime tools for testing under optional stopping are test martingales, and these
can be used to ‘generate’ useful e-variables, hence are important for us as well.
Optional Stopping We just formalized the idea of continuing from one trial (batch of data)
to the next, and potentially stopping at the end of each trial. Now we consider the closely
related ‘dual’ question: we are sequentially observing data within a single trial, but we want to
be able to stop in the midst of it, without specifying at the beginning of the trial under what
conditions we should stop. For example, we originally planned for a sample size of n but our
boss might have peeked at interim results at n′ < n and concluded that these were so promising
(or futile) that she insists on stopping the experiment, without us having anticipated this in
advance. We cannot formalize this directly with e-values, because these are themselves defined
for batches of data Y = Y n of length n which may in fact come in without any particular
order. Even if data does come in a particular order, the number n (or a data-dependent, a
priori specified stopping time N as in Appendix B) has to be specified in advance to make an
e-value well-defined, so it will not always be clear what evidential value we should assign to
the data if we want to stop at n′ < n. To deal with optional stopping, we should thus not
work with test statistics but rather with test processes, each process SW defining an evidential
value for each sample size.
Formally, a nonnegative test process S = (Si)i∈N relative to a filtration (Vi)i∈N, is defined
as a sequence of nonnegative random variables S1, S2, . . . such that each Si = si(V i) can be
written as a function of V i for some function si. We define a stopping rule g relative to (Vi)
to be any function g :
⋃
n≥0 Vn → {stop,continue} so that there exists an (arbitrarily large
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but finite) nmax such that g(vn) = stop for all n ≥ nmax, all vn ∈ Vn. We let Gall be the set
of all such functions g.
Definition 2. Let (Si)i∈N be a nonnegative test process and let G ⊂ Gall be a set of stopping
rules. We say that the threshold test based on (Si) is safe under all stopping rules in G if for
every g ∈ G as defined above, all P0 ∈ H0, for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1:
P0
(
SNstop ≥ α−1
) ≤ α, (12)
where the stopping time Nstop is the smallest n at which g(vn) = stop.
As is well-known, test martingales lead to Type I error guarantees that are preserved under
optional stopping. Formally, a test martingale relative to filtration (Vi) is a test statistic
process S1, S2, . . . where each Sn :=
∏n
i=1 Si for another process S1|0, S1|1, S1|2, . . . such that
S1|i is a function of V i and satisfies, for all P0 ∈ H0, i ≥ 1,
EP0 [S1|i−1 | V i−1] ≤ 1. (13)
We call (S1|i−1)i∈N a test martingale building block process. In the proposition below, for
P ∈ H0 ∪ H1, P [V n] denotes the marginal distribution of V n under P , and we denote its
density by p′(V n). The following results are well-known:
Proposition 3. Take any filtration (Vi) as above.
1. Suppose that H0 is a simple null for data coarsened to (Vi), i.e. for all P,Q ∈ H0, all n,
P [V n] = Q[V n]. Then for every prior W on H1, the Bayes factor p′W /p′0 defines a test
martingale, i.e. (p′W (V
i)/p′0(V i))i∈N is a test martingale relative to (Vi)i∈N.
2. Now, take any test martingale (Si)i∈N relative to filtration (Vi)i∈N. Then for all g ∈ Gall,
SNstop is an e-variable, so that by Proposition 1, the threshold test based on SNstop is
safe under optional stopping for all stopping rules that can be defined relative to (Vi).
Proof. The first part follows by applying the cancellation trick as in (6) to the conditional
likelihood ratio p′W (Vi | V i−1)/p′0(Vi | V i−1); the second part is immediate by Doob’s optional
stopping theorem.
Test Martingales vs. e-Variables Part 2 of Proposition 3 shows that test martingales
lead to tests that are safe under optional stopping. Just as important for us, it shows that
we can use any given martingale and any stopping rule g to define an e-variable. In recent
work, A. Ramdas and collaborators (Howard et al., 2018a,b) have developed a large number of
practically most useful test martingales (some of these can be thought of as Bayes factors, and
some cannot; see Section 6 for many more references and history). All these test martingales
can thus be used to ‘generate’ useful e-variables (and in fact Part 2 of Proposition 3 can easily
be extended to also generate e-variables conditional on V m for any desired m).
Conversely, we may ask ourselves whether e-variables can also be used to define test
martingales (and hence to allow for tests that are safe under optional stopping). The answer
is subtle, as we now illustrate. For simplicity, we only consider unconditional e-variables to
be used with data that are i.i.d. under all P ∈ H0. In the sections to come, we provide
constructions of e-variables for many H0; all of these can be applied to data of arbitrary fixed
sample sizes n. For any given H0, they thus ‘automatically’ provide a test statistic process
(Ei)i∈N with Ei = ei(V i).
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1. A first idea is, for any given H0 and corresponding e-variables (ei(V i)), to define the
process (Si)i∈N where S1|i−1 = e1(Vi), using only the ‘first’ e-variable. From (13) we
immediately see that (S1|i−1)i∈N is now a martingale building block process and (Si)
with Si =
∏n
i=1 e1(Vi) is a test martingale. Since in this way, we can convert all e-
variables into martingales, allowing us to do optional stopping, it may seem we have
made the concept of e-variable superfluous. But this is not the case: for many of
the H0 we consider below, this method leads to the useless test martingale with Si =
S1|i−1 ≡ 1, for all i, independent of the data. For example, this is the case for the
2×2-contingency tables (Section 4.4), for multivariate exponential families (Section 4.5)
and for the nonparametric test of Example 3 — so that the above construction would
lead to useless martingales that almost surely remain 1 forever.
2. In some cases, the test statistic process (Ei)i∈N does turn out to give a test martingale.
Examples are GROW e-variables for the case that H0 is simple (as in the one-parameter
exponential family case, Section 4.1), or for the case that the GROW e-variable for H0
can be written as a function of (Vi) such that H0 is simple when data are coarsened to
(Vi) (as in the Bayesian t-test, Section 4.3). This can be used to modify, if so desired, Ei
to another e-variable ENstop based on some stopping rule g; see Section 5.2 where this
idea is used to improve statistical power of Ei.
3. Yet in other cases, H0 is composite, and there is no natural coarsening/filtration (Vi)
under which it becomes simple. Then, at least in general, the process (ei(V i)) is not a
test martingale. Counterexamples again include the e-values for the 2 × 2-contingency
tables, multivariate exponential families and for the nonparametric test of Example 3.
We do not see an easy way to obtain test martingales, and hence tests that are safe
under ‘full’ optional stopping, for these settings. Still, sometimes tests based on the
non-martingale process (Ei)i∈N do allow for optional stopping under some non-trivial
subset G ⊂ Gall. For example, it is easy to show that the e-values for multivariate
exponential families that we consider in Section 4.5 satisfy EP0 [e(Y Nstop) | xNstop ] ≤ 1
for all P0 ∈ H0 as long as, for each n, the stopping rule g(Y n) can be written as a fixed
function of the sufficient statistic θˆ0(Y n) for H0; the tests based on these e-values are
thus safe under optional stopping relative to (Vi)i∈N := (Yi)i∈N under all such g.
3 Main Result
From here onward we let W(Θ) be the set of all probability distributions (i.e., ‘proper priors’)
on Θ, for any Θ ⊂ Θ0∪Θ1. Notably, this includes, for each θ ∈ Θ, the degenerate distribution
W which puts all mass on θ.
3.1 What is a good e-Value? The GROW Criterion
The (semi-) Bayesian approach to finding e-variables has already been treated in some detail
in Section 1.2. Thus, we focus on a frequentist perspective here, getting back to the Bayesian
approach later. We start with an example that tells us how not to design e-variables.
Example 1. [Strict Neyman-Pearson e-Values: valid but useless] In strict Neyman-
Pearson testing (Berger, 2003), one rejects the null hypothesis if the p-value P satisfies P ≤ α
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for the a priori chosen significance level α, but then one only reports “reject” rather than the
p-value itself. This can be seen as a safe test based on a special e-variable Enp: when P is a
p-value determined by data Y, we define Enp = 0 if P > α and Enp = 1/α otherwise. For
any P0 ∈ H0 we then have EY∼P0 [Enp] = P0(P ≤ α)α−1 ≤ 1, so that Enp is an e-variable,
and the ‘safe’ test that rejects if Enp ≥ 1/α obviously is identical to the test that rejects
if P ≤ α. However, with this e-variable, there is a positive probability α of losing all one’s
capital. The e-variable Enp leading to the Neyman-Pearson test, i.e. the maximum power test,
now thus corresponds to an irresponsible gamble that has a positive probability of losing all
one’s power for future experiments. This also illustrates that the e-variable property (1) is a
minimal requirement for being useful under optional continuation; in practice, one also wants
guarantees that one cannot completely lose one’s capital.
In the Neyman-Pearson paradigm, one measures the quality of a test at a given significance
level α by its power in the worst-case over all Pθ, θ ∈ Θ1. If Θ0 is nested in Θ1, one first
restricts Θ1 to a subset Θ′1 ⊂ Θ1 with Θ0 ∩Θ′1 = ∅ of ‘relevant’ or ‘sufficiently different from
Θ0’ hypotheses. For example, one takes the largest Θ′1 for which at the given sample size a
specific power can be obtained. We develop analogous versions of this idea below; for now let
us assume that we have identified such a Θ′1 that is separated from Θ0. The standard NP test
would now pick, for a given level α, the test which maximizes power over Θ′1. The example
above shows that this corresponds to an e-variable with disastrous behavior under optional
continuation. However, we now show how to develop a notion of ‘good’ e-variable analogous
to Neyman-Pearson optimality by replacing ‘power’ (probability of correct decision under Θ′1)
with expected capital growth rate under Θ′1, which then can be linked to Bayesian approaches
as well.
Taking, like NP, a worst-case approach, we aim for an e-variable with large EY∼Pθ [f(E)]
under any θ ∈ Θ′1. Here f : R+ → R is some increasing function. At first sight it may
seem best to pick f the identity, but this can lead to adoption of an e-variable such that
Pθ(E = 0) > 0 for some θ ∈ Θ′1; we have seen in the example above that that is a very bad
idea. A similar objection applies to any polynomial f , but it does not apply to the logarithm,
which is the single natural choice for f : by the law of large numbers, a sequence of e-variables
E1, E2, . . . based on i.i.d. Y(1),Y(2), . . . with, for all j, EY(j)∼P [logEj ] ≥ L, will a.s. satisfy
E〈m〉 :=
∏m
j=1Ej = exp(mL + o(m)), i.e. E will grow exponentially, and L(log2 e) lower
bounds the doubling rate (Cover and Thomas, 1991). Such exponential growth rates can only
be given for the logarithm, which is a second reason for choosing it. A third reason is that it
automatically gives e-variables an interpretation within the MDL framework (Section 7.2); a
fourth is that such growth-rate optimal E can be linked to power calculations after all, with
an especially strong link in the one-dimensional case (Section 4.1), and a fifth reason is that
some existing Bayesian procedures can also be reinterpreted in terms of growth rate.
We thus seek to find e-variables E∗ that achieve, for some Θ′1 ⊂ Θ1 \Θ0:
inf
θ∈Θ′1
EY∼Pθ [logE
∗] = sup
E∈E(Θ0)
inf
θ∈Θ′1
EY∼Pθ [logE] =: gr(Θ
′
1), (14)
where E(Θ0) is the set of all e-variables that can be defined on Y for Θ0. We call this special
E∗, if it exists and is essentially unique, the GROW (Growth-Rate-Optimal-in-Worst-case) e-
variable relative to Θ′1, and denote it by E∗Θ′1 (see Appendix C for the meaning of ‘essentially
unique’).
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If we feel Bayesian about H1, we may be willing to adopt a prior W1 on Θ1, and instead of
restricting to Θ′1, we may instead want to consider the growth rate under the prior W1. More
generally, as robust Bayesians or imprecise probabilists (Berger, 1985, Grünwald and Dawid,
2004, Walley, 1991) we may consider a whole ‘credal set’ of priors W ′1 ⊂ W(Θ1) and again
consider what happens in the worst-case over this set. We are then interested in the GROW
e-variable E∗ that achieves
inf
W∈W ′1
EY∼PW [logE
∗] = sup
E∈E(Θ0)
inf
W∈W ′1
EY∼PW [logE]. (15)
Again, if an e-variable achieving (15) exists and is essentially unique, then we denote it by
E∗W ′1 . If W
′
1 = {W1} is a single prior, we denote the e-variable by E∗W1 . (15) then reduces to
EY∼PW1 [logE
∗
W1 ] = sup
E∈E(Θ0)
EY∼PW1 [logE],
and Theorem 1, Part 2 below implies that, under regularity conditions, in this case E∗W1 =
pW1(Y)/pW ◦0 (Y) for some prior W
◦ on Θ0: the GROW E∗-variable relative to PW1 is always
a Bayes factor with PW1 in the denominator.
If W ′1 =W({θ1}) is a single prior that puts all mass on a singleton θ1, then we write E∗W ′1
as E∗θ1 . Linearity of expectation further implies that (15) and (14) coincide if W ′1 = W(Θ′1);
thus (15) generalizes (14).
All e-variables in the examples below, except for the ‘quick and dirty’ ones of Section 4.5,
are of this ‘maximin’ form. They will be defined relative to sets W ′1 with in one case (Sec-
tion 4.3)W ′ representing a set of prior distributions on Θ1, and in other cases (Section 4.1–4.4)
W ′1 =W(Θ′1) for a ‘default’ choice of a subset of Θ1.
3.2 The JIPr is GROW
We now present our main result, illustrated in Figure 1. We use D(P‖Q) to denote the
relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence between distributions P and Q (Cover
and Thomas, 1991). We call an e-variable trivial if it is always ≤ 1, irrespective of the data,
i.e. no evidence against H0 can be obtained. The first part of the theorem below implies
that nontrivial e-variables essentially always exist as long as Θ0 6= Θ1. The second part —
really implied by the third but stated separately for convenience — characterizes when such
e-variables take the form of a likelihood ratio/Bayes factor. The third says that GROW e-
variables for a whole set of distributions Θ′1 can be found by a joint KL minimization problem.
Part 3 of the theorem refers to a coarsening of Y. This is any random variable V that
can be written as a function of Y, i.e. V = f(Y) for some function f ; in particular, the result
holds with f the identity and V = Y. For general coarsenings V, the distributions Pθ for Y
induce marginal distributions for V, which we denote by P [V]θ .
Theorem 1. 1. Let W1 ∈ W(Θ1) such that infW0∈W(Θ0)D(PW1‖PW0) <∞ and such that
for all θ ∈ Θ0, Pθ is absolutely continuous relative to PW1. Then the GROW e-variable
E∗W1 exists, is essentially unique, and satisfies
EY∼PW1 [logE
∗
W1 ] = sup
E∈E(Θ0)
EY∼PW1 [logE] = infW0∈W(Θ0)
D(PW1‖PW0)
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2. Let W1 be as above and suppose further that the inf/min is achieved by some W ◦0 , i.e.
infW0∈W(Θ0)D(PW1‖PW0) = D(PW1‖PW ◦0 ). Then the minimum is achieved uniquely by
this W ◦0 and the GROW e-variable takes a simple form: E∗W1 = pW1(Y)/pW ◦0 (Y).
3. Now let Θ′1 ⊂ Θ1 and let W ′1 be a subset of W(Θ′1) such that for some coarsening V
of Y (we may have Y = V) the following holds: for all θ ∈ Θ0, all W1 ∈ W ′1, P [V]θ
is absolutely continuous relative to P [V]W1 , and the set {P
[V]
W1
: W1 ∈ W ′1} is convex (this
holds automatically if W ′1 is convex). Suppose that
inf
W1∈W ′1
inf
W0∈W0
D(PW1‖PW0) = min
W1∈W ′1
min
W0∈W0
D(P
[V]
W1
‖P [V]W0 ) = D(P
[V]
W ∗1
‖P [V]W ∗0 ) <∞, (16)
the minimum being achieved by some (W ∗1 ,W ∗0 ) such that D(PW1‖PW ∗0 ) < ∞ for all
W1 ∈ W ′1. If the minimum is achieved uniquely by (W ∗1 ,W ∗0 ), then the GROW e-variable
E∗W ′1 relative to W
′
1 exists, is essentially unique, and is given by
E∗W ′1 =
p′W ∗1 (V)
p′W ∗0 (V)
, (17)
where p′W is the density on V corresponding to P
[V]
W . Also, E
∗
W ′1 satisfies
inf
W∈W ′1
EY∼PW [logE
∗
W ′1 ] = sup
E∈E(Θ0)
inf
W∈W ′1
EY∼PW [logE] = D(P
[V]
W ∗1
‖P [V]W ∗0 ). (18)
If W ′1 =W(Θ′1), then by linearity of expectation we further have E∗W ′1 = E
∗
Θ′1
.
The requirements that, for θ ∈ Θ0, the Pθ are absolutely continuous relative to the PW1 ,
and, in Part 3, that D(PW1‖PW ∗0 ) < ∞ for all W1 ∈ W ′1 are quite mild — in any case
they hold in all specific examples considered below, specifically if Θ0 ⊂ Θ1 represent general
multivariate exponential families, see Section 4.5. Since the KL divergence is strictly convex
in both arguments if the other argument is held fixed, and nonstrictly jointly convex, we have
that if (16) holds, then for each (W ′1,W ′0) achieving the minimum, either W ′1 = W ∗1 ,W ′0 = W ∗0
or bothW ′1 6= W∗1 andW ′0 6= W ∗0 . In the latter case, all mixtures (1−α)(W ′1,W ′0)+α(W1,W0)
also achieve the minimum.
Following Li (1999), we call PW ◦ as in Part 2 of the theorem, the Reverse Information
Projection (RIPr) of PW1 on {PW : W ∈ W(Θ0)}. Extending this terminology we call
(PW ∗1 , PW ∗0 ) the joint information projection (JIPr) of {PW : W ∈ W ′1} and {PW : W ∈W(Θ0)} onto each other.
The requirement for the full JIPr characterization (18), that the minima are both achieved
is strong in general, but it holds in the examples of Section 4.1 (1-dimensional) and 4.4
(2 × 2 tables) with V = Y. By allowing V to be a coarsening of Y, we make the condition
considerably weaker: it then also holds in the t-test example of Section 4.3 — that example
will also illustrate that {P [V]W1 : W1 ∈ W ′1} may be convex even if W ′1 is not, and that in cases
where the minimum in (16) over PW1 on Y does not exist, still its infimum over PW1 on Y
may be equal to the minimum over PW1 defined on V, which does exist.
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Proof Sketch of Parts 2 and 3 We give short proofs of parts 2 and 3 under the (weak)
additional condition that we can exchange expectation and differentiation and the (strong)
condition that V is taken equal to Y. To prove parts 2 and 3 without these conditions, we
need a nonstandard minimax theorem; and to prove part 1 (which does not rely on minima
being achieved) we need a deep result from Barron and Li (Li, 1999); these extended proofs
are in Appendix C.
For Part 2, consider any W ′0 ∈ W(Θ0) with W ′0 6= W ◦0 , with W ◦0 as in the theorem state-
ment. Straightforward differentiation shows that the derivative (d/dα)D(PW1‖P(1−α)W ◦0 +αW ′0)
at α = 0 is given by f(α) := 1−EY∼PW ′0 [pW1(Y)/pW ◦0 (Y)]. Since (1−α)W
◦
0 +αW
′
0 ∈ W(Θ0)
for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the fact that W ◦0 achieves the minimum over W(Θ0) implies that f(0) ≥ 0,
but this implies that EY∼PW ′0
[pW1(Y)/pW ◦0 (Y)] ≤ 1. Since this reasoning holds for all
W ′0 ∈ W(Θ0), we get that pW1(Y)/pW ◦0 (Y) is an e-variable. To see that it is GROW, note
that, for every e-variable E = e(Y) relative to E(Θ0), we must have, with q(y) := e(y)pW ◦0 (y),
that
∫
q(y) dy = EY∼PW◦0 [E] ≤ 1, so q is a sub-probability density, and by the information
inequality of information theory (Cover and Thomas, 1991), we have
EPW1 [logE] = EPW1
[
log
q(Y)
pW ◦0 (Y)
]
≤ EPW1
[
log
pW1(Y)
pW ◦0 (Y)
]
= EPW1
[
logE∗W1
]
,
implying that E∗W1 is GROW.
For Part 3, consider any W ′1 ∈ W ′1 with W ′1 6= W ∗1 , W ∗1 ,W ∗0 as in the theorem statement.
Straightforward differentiation and reasoning analogously to Part 2 above shows that the
derivative (d/dα)D(P(1−α)W ∗1 +αW ′1‖PW ∗0 ) at α = 0 is nonnegative iff there is no α > 0 such that
EP(1−α)W∗1 +αW ′1
[log pW ∗1 (Y)/pW ∗0 (Y)] ≤ EPW∗1 [log pW ∗1 (Y)/pW ∗0 (Y)]. Since this holds for all
W ′1 ∈ W ′1, and since D(PW ∗1 ‖PW ∗0 ) = infW∈W ′1 D(PW ‖PW ∗0 ), it follows that
infW∈W ′1 EPW [logE
∗
W ′1 ] = D(PW
∗
1
‖PW ∗0 ), which is already part of (18). Note that we also
have
inf
W∈W ′1
EY∼PW [logE
∗
W ′1 ] ≤ sup
E∈E(Θ0)
inf
W∈W ′1
EY∼PW [logE]
≤ inf
W∈W ′1
sup
E∈E(Θ0)
EY∼PW [logE]
= inf
W∈W ′1
sup
E∈E(W(Θ0))
EY∼PW [logE]
≤ inf
W∈W ′1
sup
E∈E({W ∗0 })
EY∼PW [logE]
≤ sup
E∈E({W ∗0 })
EY∼PW∗1 [logE].
where the first two and final inequalities are trivial, the third one follows from definition of
e-variable and linearity of expectation, and the fourth one follows because, as is immediate
from the definition of e-variable, for any set W0 of priors on Θ0, the set of e-variables relative
to any set W ′ ⊂ W0 must be a superset of the set of e-variables relative to W0.
It thus suffices if we can show that supE∈E({W ∗0 })EY∼PW∗1 [logE] ≤ D(PW ∗1 ‖PW ∗0 ). For
this, consider e-variables E = e(Y) ∈ E({W ∗0 }) defined relative to the singleton hypothesis
{W ∗0 }. Since EY∼PW∗0 [e(Y)] ≤ 1 we can write e(Y) = q(Y)/pW ∗0 (Y) for some sub-probability
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density q, and
sup
E∈E({PW∗0 })
EPW∗1
[logE] = sup
q
EY∼PW∗1
[
log
q(Y)
pW ∗0
]
(19)
= D(PW ∗1 ‖PW ∗0 ),
where the supremum is over all sub-probability densities on Y and the final equality is the
information (in)equality again (Cover and Thomas, 1991). The result follows.
3.3 δ-GROW and simple δ-GROW e-Values
To apply Theorem 1 to design e-variables with good frequentist properties in the case that
Θ0 ( Θ1, we must choose a subset Θ′1 with Θ′1 ∩ Θ0 = ∅. Usually, we first carve up Θ1
into nested subsets Θ(). A convenient manner to do this is to pick a divergence measure
d : Θ1 × Θ0 → R+0 with d(θ1‖θ0) = 0 ⇔ θ1 = θ0, and, defining d(θ) := infθ0∈Θ0 d(θ, θ0)
(examples below) so that
Θ() := {θ ∈ Θ1 : d(θ) ≥ }. (20)
In the examples below we are interested in GROW e-variables E∗Θ() for a given measure d
for some particular value of . This is in full analogy to classical frequentist testing, where
we look for tests with worst-case optimal power with alternatives restricted to sets Θ();
we merely replace ‘power’ by ‘growth rate’. In some cases such e-variables E∗Θ() take on a
particularly simple form, as Bayes factors with all mass in Θ1 concentrated on the boundary
bd(Θ()) = {θ ∈ Θ1 : d(θ) = }.
To develop these ideas further, for simplicity we restrict to the common case with just
a single scalar parameter of interest δ ∈ ∆ ⊆ R so that H0,H1 can be parameterized as
Θ1 = {(δ, γ) : δ ∈ ∆, γ ∈ Γ} and Θ0 = {(0, γ) : γ ∈ Γ}, with Γ representing all distributions
in H0. We can then simply take d((δ, γ)) = |δ| so that Θ(δ) = {(δ, γ) : δ ∈ ∆, |δ| ≥ δ, γ ∈ Γ}.
Then the e-variable E∗Θ(δ) with δ > 0 will be referred to as the δ-GROW e-variable for short.
Further defining E∗δ := E
∗
{(δ,γ):|δ|=δ,γ∈Γ}, we call E
∗
Θ(δ) simple if
E∗Θ(δ) = E
∗
δ (21)
In all examples below, the δ-GROW e is also simple, making it particularly easy to deal with.
To illustrate, consider first the one-sided case with ∆ ⊆ R+0 . Then, applying Theorem 1,
Part 3 with Θ = {(δ, γ) : γ ∈ Γ} and assuming the KL-infimum is achieved, we must have
E∗δ = pδ,W ∗1 [γ](Y)/p0,W ∗0 [Γ](Y) for some priors W
∗
1 [γ],W
∗
0 [γ] on γ. We see that (21) holds iff
sup
E∈E({0})
inf
θ∈Θ(δ)
EY∼Pθ [logE] = inf
θ∈Θ(δ)
EY∼PθE[logE
∗
δ ] (22)
= D(Pδ,W ∗1 [γ]‖P0,W ∗0 [γ]). (23)
In Appendix D, Proposition 5 we provide some sufficient conditions for (22) to hold.
Now consider the two-sided case with scalar parameter space ∆′ an interval containing 0 in
its interior. Since, by linearity of expectation, mixtures of e-variables are obviously e-variables,
E◦δ :=
1
2
E∗δ +
1
2
E∗−δ (24)
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is a simple e-variable. While E◦δ will be seen to be δ-GROW in the two-sided Gaussian location
and t-test setting, in general, we have no guarantee that it is δ-GROW. Still, in Appendix D
we show that if its constituents are one-sided GROW, i.e. (21) holds for the 1-sided case with
∆ set to ∆+ and with ∆ set to −∆−, then the worst-case growth rate achieved by E◦δ is
guaranteed to be close (within log 2) of the two-sided δ-based GROW e-variable E∗Θ(δ). In
such cases we may think of E◦δ as a simple δ-almost-GROW e-variable. E
◦
δ may be much easier
to compute than the actual two-sided GROW e-variable E∗Θ(δ).
4 Examples
4.1 Point null vs. one-parameter exponential family
Let {Pθ | θ ∈ Θ} with Θ ⊂ R represent a 1-parameter exponential family for sample space Y,
given in its mean-value parameterization, such that 0 ∈ Θ, and take Θ1 to be some interval
(t′, t) for some −∞ ≤ t′ ≤ 0 < t ≤ ∞, such that t′, 0 and t are contained in the interior of
Θ. Let Θ0 = {0}. Both H0 = {P0} and H1 = {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ1} are extended to outcomes in
Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) by the i.i.d. assumption. For notational simplicity we set
D(θ‖0) := D(Pθ(Y)‖P0(Y)) = nD(Pθ(Y1)‖P0(Y1)). (25)
We consider the δ-GROW e-variables E∗Θ(δ) relative to sets Θ(δ) as in (20). Since H0 is simple,
we can simply take θ to be the parameter of interest, hence ∆ = Θ1 and Γ plays no role, so
that Θ(δ) = {θ ∈ Θ1 : |θ| ≥ δ}.
One-Sided Test: simple GROW e-Variable Here we set t′ = 0 so that Θ(δ) = {θ ∈
Θ1 : θ ≥ δ}. We show in Appendix D that this is a case in which (21) holds: the δ-GROW
e-variable is simple, and can be calculated as a likelihood ratio E∗Θ(δ) = pδ(Y)/p0(Y) between
two point hypotheses, even though Θ(δ) is composite.
GROW e-Variables and UMP Bayes tests We now show that, for this 1-sided testing
case, for a specific value of δ, E∗Θ(δ) coincides with the uniformly most powerful Bayes tests of
Johnson (2013b), giving further motivation for their use and an indication of how to choose
δ if no a priori knowledge is available. Note first that, since Θ0 = {0} is a singleton, by
Theorem 1, Part 2, we have that E∗W = pW (Y)/p0(Y), i.e. for all W ∈ W(Θ1), the GROW
e-variable relative to {W} is given by the Bayes factor pW /p0. The following result is a direct
consequence of (Johnson, 2013b, Lemma 1).
Theorem 2 (Uniformly Most Powerful Bayes Test (Johnson, 2013b)). Consider the
setting above. Fix any 0 < α < 1 and assume that there is δ ∈ Θ1 with D(δ‖0) = − logα.
Then among the class of all threshold-based tests based on local Bayes factors, i.e. all tests of
the form “reject iff pW (Y)/p0(Y) ≥ 1/α” for someW ∈ W(Θ1), the Type-II error is uniformly
minimized over Θ1 by setting W to a degenerate distribution putting all mass on δ:
for all θ ∈ Θ1 : min
W∈W(Θ1)
Pθ
(
pW (Y)
p0(Y)
≥ 1
α
)
= Pθ
(
pδ(Y)
p0(Y)
≥ 1
α
)
,
and with the test that rejects iff pδ(Y)/p0(Y) ≥ 1/α, H0 will be rejected iff the ML estimator
θˆ satisfies θˆ ≥ δ.
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Theorem 2 shows that, in the context of 1-sided testing with 1-parameter exponential
families, if a GROW e-variable is to be used in a safe test with given significance level α
and one is further interested in maximizing power among all GROW e-variables (i.e. with
respect to any set W ′1 of priors on Θ1), then one should use the simple e-variable E∗δ with
D(Pδ(Y1)‖P0(Y1)) = (− logα)/n since this will lead to the uniformly most powerful GROW
test.
Example 2. [Normal Location, 1- and 2-sided] Consider the normal location setting
of Section 1.3 with Θ0 = {0} as before, and µ ∈ Θ1, the mean, the parameter of interest.
First take Θ1 = R+, i.e. a one-sided test. Then E∗Θ(µ) = pµ(Y)/p0(Y) and has gr(Θ(µ)) =
D(µ‖0) = (n/2)‖µ2‖. We now see that the uniformly most powerful δ-GROW e-variable at
sample size n is given by the µ˜n with D(µ˜n‖0) = − logα, so that µ˜n =
√
2(− logα)/n. Thus
(unsurprisingly), this GROW e-variable is a likelihood ratio test between 0 and µ˜n at distance
to 0 of order 1/
√
n, and we expect to gain (at least) − logα in capital growth if data are
sampled from µ ≥ µ˜n.
In the two-sided case, with Θ1 = R, we can pick the almost-δ-GROW simple e-value (24),
i.e. E◦µ = ((1/2)pµ(Y) + (1/2)p−µ(Y)) /p0(Y). Using the distributions’ symmetry around
0, , we can show (Appendix D) that in this case, E◦µ = E∗µ, i.e. E◦µ is in fact GROW for
Θ(µ) = {µ : |µ| ≥ µ}. Even though in this 2-sided case we have no proof that it results in a
uniformly most powerful δ-GROW e-variable, we can still, when aiming for a high-power test,
take our cue from the 1-sided cases and pick E◦µ˜n for the µ˜n such that gr(Θ(µ˜n)) = − logα.
This leads to the test we described in Section 1.3 with threshold
√
cn/n→ 2.72/
√
n.
4.2 Nonparametric e-Variables
Some of the most well-known classical nonparametric tests are based on identifying a statistic
U = f(Y) that has the same distribution P0[U] under all θ ∈ Θ0. This U is then the test
statistic on which a p-value is based. At the same time, it is common to report an (empirical)
effect size δˆ(U) for such a test, giving an indication of the found deviation from the null;
the precise definition of δˆ varies from case to case. For any distribution P for Y and any
given definition of δˆ we will write δ(P ) := EU∼P [δˆ(U)] for the population effect size. For
simplicity we restrict ourselves to cases in which δˆ is a monotonically increasing function of
U and δ(P0) = 0. Assuming we have chosen a test statistic U and a definition for δˆ, we can
extend the previous definitions to δ-GROW e-variables based on U or equivalently, δˆ. The idea
is that H0 and H1 are so large that a GROW (or uniformly-most-powerful) e-variable among
all e-variables for H0 and H1 does not exist or is too hard to find; instead we make life easier
by searching for the e-variable that is GROW among all e-variables that can be written as a
function of U, which is a strict subset of those that can be written as a function of Y. This is
easier since U has the same distribution P0[U] under all P0 ∈ H0. To this end, assume P0[U]
has density p0 against some background measure µ. We define Pλ as the distribution with
density pλ(u) ∝ exp(λδˆ(u))p0(u). Let Λ be the set of λ for which Pλ is well-defined, i.e. for
which
∫
p0(u) exp(λδˆ(u)) dµ(u) <∞. Then P := {Pλ : λ ∈ Λ} is an exponential family given
in its natural parameterization, and by a standard property of exponential families, EPλ [δˆ(U)]
is monotonically increasing in λ. Rephrasing in the mean-value parameterization we can thus
write P[δ] := Pλδ where λδ is the λ such that EPλ [δˆ(U)] = δ.
Consider a one-sided test with H1 representing δ(P ) > 0. Since we have reduced the
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problem to the 1-sided 1-dimensional exponential family case of Section 4.1, we can once
again conclude (21). That is, for δ > 0 such that P[δ][U] is well-defined, we have that E∗ =
p[δ](U)/p[0](U) is a simple e-variable that is GROW relative to the set {P ∈ H1 : δ(P ) ≥ δ},
for data coarsened to U. We can then define a simple two-sided e-variable analogously to
Example 2. Also, Theorem 2 for 1-dimensional exponential families above tells us that, for δ
chosen so that
D
(
P[δ][U]‖P[0][U]
)
= − logα, (26)
the uniformly-most-powerful GROW safe test is the test that rejects iff E∗ ≥ 1/α, under the
assumption that U ∼ Pδ for δ 6= 0. While by construction we can assume that U ∼ P0 under
the null, we cannot assume that U ∼ Pδ for some δ under the alternative; our constructed
model may be misspecified. Whether E∗ still has a UMP property is thus an interesting
question for future research.
Example 3. In the Mann-Whitney U test, we are given n = na + nb outcomes, with na
outcomes in group a and nb in group b. This can be represented as n pairs (Xi, Yi) with
Xi ∈ {a, b}, Yi ∈ R, Xi indicating the group of the ith outcome, and nj =
∑n
i=1 1Xi=j , for
j ∈ {a, b}. Under H1, all outcomes in group a are i.i.d., all outcomes in group b are i.i.d.,
but the two distributions are not the same; under H0, all outcomes are i.i.d. with the same
distribution.
The Mann-Whitney U test is based on the Mann-Whitney U statistic (see any text book
for a definition). For every fixed na and nb, under all P ∈ H0, i.e all distributions such that
Y = (Y1, . . . , Yna+nb) is i.i.d. with Yi ⊥ Xi, U has the same discrete distribution P[0][U] with
mass function p[0](u) with some finite support U . U is normally used to calculate a p-value.
Instead, we use it to calculate an e-value in the manner indicated above: a standard effect size
for the Mann-Whitney test is U/(nanb). Instead for convenience we take δˆ = U/(nanb)−1/2,
so that EP0 [δˆ] = 0. Define
pλ(u) :=
p0(u) · eλδˆ(u)∑
u′∈U p0(u′)eλδˆ(u
′)
Since U has a finite range, pλ is well-defined for λ ∈ R and it is the probability mass function
of the Pλ defined earlier. Then P[δ](U) = Pλ(U) for the λ with EPλ [U] = δ, and the GROW
e-variables relative to {P ∈ H1 : δ(P ) ≥ δ} are simple: they are likelihood ratios for coarsened
data U of the form p[δ](U)/p[0](U).
4.3 The Bayesian t-test and the simple δ-GROW t-test
Jeffreys (1961) proposed a Bayesian version of the t-test; see also (Rouder et al., 2009). We
start with the models H0 and H1 for data Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) given as H0 = {P0,σ(Y) | σ ∈ Γ};
H1 = {Pδ,σ(Y) | (δ, σ) ∈ Θ1}, where ∆ = R,Γ = R+, Θ1 := ∆× Γ and Θ0 = {(0, σ) : σ ∈ Γ},
and Pδ,σ has density
pδ,σ(y) =
exp
(
−n2
[(
y
σ − δ
)2
+
( 1
n
∑n
i=1(yi−y)2
σ2
)])
(2piσ2)n/2
,
with y = 1n
∑n
i=1 yi.
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Jeffreys proposed to equip H1 with a Cauchy prior W c[δ] on the effect size δ, and both
H0 and H0 with the scale-invariant prior measure with density wH(σ) ∝ 1/σ on the variance.
Below we first show that, even though this prior is improper (whereas the priors appearing
in Theorem 1 are invariably proper), the resulting Bayes factor is an e-variable. We then
show that, for priors W [δ] with more than 2 moments, it is in fact even the GROW e-variable
relative to all distributions in H1 compatible with W [δ]. Thus, GROW optimality holds
for most priors W [δ] one might want to use, including standard choices (such as a standard
normal) and nonstandard choices (such as the two-point prior we will suggest further below)
but ironically not to the moment-less Cauchy proposed by Jeffreys.
Almost Bayesian Case: prior on δ available For any proper prior distribution W [δ] on
δ and any proper prior distribution W [σ] on σ, we define
pW [δ],W [σ](y) =
∫
δ∈∆
∫
σ∈Γ
pδ,σ(y) dW [δ] dW [σ],
as the Bayes marginal density under the product prior W [δ]×W [σ]. In case that W [σ] puts
all its mass on a single σ, this reduces to:
pW [δ],σ(y) =
∫
δ∈∆
pδ,σ(y) dW [δ]. (27)
For convenience later on we set the sample space to be Yn = (R \ {0}) × Rn−1, assuming
beforehand that the first outcome will not be 0 — an outcome that has measure 0 under all
distributions in H0 and H1 anyway. Now we define V := (V1, . . . , Vn) with Vi = Yi/|Y1|. We
have that Y determines V, and (V, Y1) determines Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn). The distributions
in H0 ∪ H1 can thus alternatively be thought of as distributions on the pair (V, Y1). V is
“Y with the scale divided out”: it is well-known (and easy to check, see Appendix E) that
under all P ∈ H0, i.e. all P0,σ with σ > 0, V has the same distribution P0[V] with density
p′0. Similarly, one shows that under all PW [δ],σ with σ > 0, V has the same pdf p′W [δ] (which
therefore does not depend on the prior on σ). We now get that, for all σ > 0,
E∗W [δ]〈V〉 :=
p′W [δ](V)
p′0(V)
(28)
satisfies EV∼P [E∗W [δ]〈V〉] = 1 for all P ∈ H0, hence it is an e-variable. Here we introduced
the notation E∗W [δ]〈V〉 for e-variables that are GROW relative to W for data ‘at level’ V,
i.e among all e-variables that can be written as functions of V (see Appendix A for further
explanation).
Remarkably, this ‘scale-free’ e-variable coincides with the Bayes factor one gets if one uses,
for σ, the prior wH(σ) = 1/σ suggested by Jeffreys, and treats σ and δ as independent. That
is, as shown in Appendix E, we have∫
σ p¯W [δ],σ(Y)w
H(σ) dσ∫
σ p0,σ(Y)w
H(σ) dσ
=
p′W [δ](V)
p′0(V)
= E∗W [δ]〈V〉. (29)
Despite its improperness, wH induces a valid e-variable when used in the Bayes factor. The
equivalence of this Bayes factor to E∗W [δ]〈V〉 simply means that it manages to ignore the
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‘nuisance’ part of the model and models the likelihood of the scale-free V instead. The reason
this is possible is that wH coincides with the right-Haar prior for this problem (Eaton, 1989,
Berger et al., 1998), about which we will say more below. Amazingly, it turns out that the
e-variable (29) is GROW (among all e-variables for data Y, not just the coarsened V!) under
the weak condition that the prior W [δ] has a (2 + )th moment. This follows from Part 1
of our second main result, Theorem 3 below. Its proof is by no means straightforward (at
least, we did not find a simple proof). Let, for priors W [δ],W [σ], P [V]W [δ],W [σ] be the marginal
distribution on V, i.e. the distribution with density p′W [δ],W [σ].
Theorem 3. Let W [δ] be a distribution on δ such that for some  > 0, Eδ∼W [δ][|δ|2+] < ∞
for some  > 0 (in particular this includes all degenerate priors with mass 1 on a single δ¯).
Let W[Γ] be the set of all distributions W [σ] on the variance σ. We have:
inf
W ′[σ],W [σ]∈W(Γ)
D(PW [δ],W ′[σ]‖P0,W [σ]) = inf
W [σ]∈W(Γ)
D(PW [δ],W [σ]‖P0,W [σ])
= D(P
[V]
W [δ]‖P
[V]
0 ). (30)
More generally, fix a convex set of distributions W[δ] on δ such that, for some  > 0, each
W [δ] ∈ W[δ] satisfies Eδ∼W [δ][|δ|2+] < ∞. Let W ′1 be a set of probability distributions on
δ × σ such that, for each W [δ] ∈ W[δ] and each distribution W [σ] ∈ W(Γ) on σ, W ′ contains
a distribution whose marginal on δ coincides with W [δ] and whose marginal on σ coincides
with W [σ]. We then have:
inf
W∈W ′1
inf
W [σ]∈W[Γ]
D(PW ‖P0,W [σ]) = inf
W [δ]∈W[δ]
inf
W [σ]∈W[Γ]
D(PW [δ],W [σ]‖P0,W [σ])
= inf
W [δ]∈W[δ]
D(P
[V]
W [δ]‖P
[V]
0 ). (31)
Part 1 of this theorem allows us to use Part 3 of Theorem 1 to conclude that E∗W [δ]〈V〉 =
E∗W1 : the Bayes factor based on the right Haar prior, is not just an e-variable, but even the
GROW e-variable relative to the set of all priors on δ × σ that are compatible with W [δ].
Simple GROW safe t-test: prior on δ not available What if we have no clear idea on
how to choose a marginal prior on δ? In that case, we can once again use the δ-GROW e-
variable for δ. First, consider 1-sided tests. In Appendix D we show that (21) holds in this case,
i.e. minW∈W(Θ(δ))D(P
[Y]
W ‖P [Y]0 ) is achieved for the degenerate prior that puts mass 1 on δ, i.e.
the δ-GROW e-variable is simple. We can then use Theorem 3 above to infer that the Bayes
factor based on the right Haar prior wH on σ and this point prior on δ, i.e. E∗δ = p
′
δ(V)/p
′
0(V)
is equal to the GROW e-variable relative to Θ(δ). Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for the
2-sided test: as shown in Appendix D, with the GROW set Θ(δ) = {δ : |δ| ≥ δ} we get that
the δ-GROW e-variable is simple, and given by the Bayes factor with, for H1, the prior on δ
that puts mass 1/2 on δ and 1/2 on −δ.
Optional Stopping For any priorW [δ], E∗W [δ] defines a test statistic process (E
∗
W [δ]〈V i〉)i∈N
with E∗W [δ]〈V i〉 = p′W [δ](V i)/p′0(V i). Notably, tests based on this process are safe for optional
stopping under Definition 2: by Proposition 3, this process defines a test martingale and
hence, by the same proposition, the threshold test based on (E∗W [δ]〈V i〉)i∈N preserves Type
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I error guarantees also under optional stopping. As indicated by (Hendriksen et al., 2018),
this test does not necessarily preserve Type-I error guarantees under optional stopping with
stopping rules that can only be written as function of Y1, Y2, . . . and not of V1, V2, . . .. But,
since E∗W [δ]〈V i〉 is a function of the Vi, it does allow for the prototypical instance of optional
stopping, where we stop at the smallest t at which E∗W [δ]〈V t〉 > 20 = 1/α. The insight that
E∗W [δ] provides a test martingale is not new: as we learned from A. Ramdas, it was already
considered by Robbins (1970).
Extension to General Group Invariant Bayes Factors In a series of papers (Berger
et al., 1998, Dass and Berger, 2003, Bayarri et al., 2012), Berger and collaborators developed a
theory of Bayes factors forH0 = {P0,γ : γ ∈ Γ} andH1 = {Pδ,γ : δ ∈ ∆, γ ∈ Γ} with a nuisance
parameter (vector) γ that appears in both models and that satisfies a group invariance; the
Bayesian t-test is the special case with γ = σ,Γ = R+ and with the scalar multiplication
group and δ an ‘effect size’. Other examples include regression based on mixtures of g-priors
(Liang et al., 2008) and the many examples given by e.g. Berger et al. (1998), Dass and Berger
(2003), such as testing a Weibull vs. the log-normal or an exponential vs. the log-normal. The
reasoning of the first part of this section straightforwardly generalizes to all such cases: under
some conditions on the prior on δ, the Bayes factor based on using the right Haar measure on
γ in both models gives rise to an e-variable. We furthermore conjecture that in all such testing
problems, the resulting Bayes factor is even GROW relative to a suitably defined set W1; i.e.
that a suitable analogue of Theorem 3 holds. The proof of this theorem seems extendable to
the general group invariant setting, with the possible exception of Lemma 4 in Appendix E
which uses particular properties of the variance of a normal; generalizing this lemma (which
also requires us to handle models with a nonunique right Haar prior (Sun and Berger, 2007),
for which it is not immediately clear how a generalization would look like) is a major goal for
future work.
4.4 Contingency Tables
Let Yn = {0, 1}n and let X = {a, b} represent two categories. We start with a multinomial
model G1 on Z = X ×Y, extended to n outcomes by independence. We want to test whether
the Yi are dependent on the Xi. To this end, we condition every distribution in G1 on a fixed,
given, X = x = (x1, . . . , xn), and we let H1 be the set of (conditional) distributions on Z that
thus result.
We thus assume the design of X n to be set in advance, but N1, the number of ones, to be
random; alternative choices are possible and would lead to a different analysis. Conditioned
on X = x, the counts n, na = Na(x) and nb (see Table 1), the likelihood of an individual
sequence y | x with statistics Na0, Nb0, Nb0, Nb1 becomes:
pµ1|a,µ1|b(y | x) = pµ1|a,µ1|b(y | x, na, nb, n) (32)
= µNa11|a (1− µ1|a)Na0 · µNb11|b (1− µ1|b)Nb0
These densities define the alternative model H1 = {Pµ1|a,µ1|b : (µ1|a, µ1|b) ∈ Θ1} with Θ1 =
[0, 1]2. H0, the null model, simply has X = (X1, . . . , Xn) and Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) independent,
with Yi, . . . , Yn i.i.d. Ber(µ1) distributed, µ1 ∈ Θ0 := [0, 1], i.e.
pµ1(y | x) = pµ1(y) = µN11 (1− µ1)N0 .
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To test H0 against H1, we numerically calculate the GROW e-variable E∗Θ() where Θ() is
0 1 sum
a µa0 µa1 µa
b µb0 µb1 µb
sum µ0 µ1 1
0 1 sum
a Na0 Na1 na
b Nb0 Nb1 nb
sum N0 N1 n
Table 1: 2x2 contingency table: parameters and counts. µij is the (unconditional) probability
of observing category i and outcome j, and Nij is the corresponding count in the observed
sample.
defined via (20) for two different divergence measures detailed further below. In both cases,
Θ() will be compact, so that by the joint lower-semi-continuity of the KL divergence (Posner,
1975), minD(PW1‖PW0) is achieved by some unique (W ∗1 ,W ∗2 ), and we can use Part 3 of
Theorem 1 to infer that the GROW e-variable is given by E∗W(Θ()) = E
∗
Θ() = pW ∗1 (Y |
X)/pW ∗0 (Y). Note that the ‘priors’ W
∗
1 and W ∗0 may depend on the observed x = xn, in
particular on na and nb, since we take these as given throughout. We can further employ
Carathéodory’s theorem (see Appendix E.2 for details) to give us that W ∗1 and W ∗0 must have
finite support, which allows us to find them reasonably efficiently by numerical optimization;
we give an illustration in the next section.
We now consider two definitions of Θ(). The first option is to think of µ1 as a ‘nuisance’
parameter: we want to test for independence, and are not interested in the precise value of µ1,
but rather in the ‘effect size’ δ := |µ1|a − µ1|b|. We can then, once again, use the δ-GROW e-
variable for parameter of interest δ. To achieve this, we re-parameterize the model in a manner
that depends on x via na and nb. For given µ1|a and µ1|b, we set µ1 = (naµ1|a + nbµ1|b)/n,
and δ as above, and we define p′δ,µ1(y|x) (the probability in the new parameterization) to be
equal to pµ1|a,µ1|b(y|x) as defined above. As long as x (and hence na and nb) remain fixed,
this re-parameterization is 1-to-1, and all distributions in the null model H0 correspond to
a p′δ,µ1 with δ = 0. In Figure 2 we show, for the case na = nb = 10, the sets Θ(δ) for
δ = {0.42, 0.46, 0.55, 0.67, 0.79}. For example, for δ = 0.42, Θ(δ) is given by the region on the
boundary, and outside of, the ‘beam’ defined by the two depicted lines closest to the diagonal.
We numerically determined the JIPr, i.e., the prior (PW ∗0 , PW ∗1 ) for each choice of δ. This prior
has finite support, the support points are depicted by the dots; in line with intuition, we find
that the support points for priors on the set Θ(δ) are always on the line(s) of points closest
to the null model, i.e. the δ-GROW e-variable is simple. Variations of this definition of Θ(δ)
and corresponding GROW e-values have been considered by Turner (2019), who showed that
for one-sided testing, one can calculate the above JIPr analytically; moreoever, if data comes
in as pairs of each group, so that all Xi are give by (a, b) and Yi = (yia, yib) ∈ {0, 1}2, then on
this rougher filtration, (where na = nb at all sample points), the JIPR for each n defines a test
martingale and, along the lines of Proposition 3, we can use it for testing that is safe under
optional stopping. The second option for defining Θ() is to take the original parameterization,
and have d in (20)) be the KL divergence. This choice is motivated in Appendix F. Then Θ()
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Figure 2: The Beam: Graphical depiction of the GROW Θ(δ).
is the set of (µ1|a, µ1|b) with
inf
µ′1∈[0,1]
D(Pµ1|a,µ1|b‖Pµ′1)
n
=
D(Pµ1|a,µ1|b‖Pµ1)
n
≥ .
Note that the scaling by 1/n is just for convenience — since Pµ|. are defined as distributions of
samples of length n, the KL grows with n and our scaling ensures that, for given µ1|a, µ1|b and
n1a, n1,b, the set Θ() does not change if we multiply n1a and n1b by the same fixed positive
integer. Note also that the distributions Pµ1|a,µ1|b and Pµ1 are again conditional on the given
x (and hence na and nb), and µ1 = (naµ1|a + nbµ1|b)/n as before. We can now numerically
determine Θ() for various values of ; this is done in Figure 3, where, for example, the set Θ()
for  ∈ {log 10, log 20, . . . , log 400} is given by all points on and outside of the inner-mostly
depicted ‘lemon’. Again, we can calculate the corresponding JIPr; the support points of the
corresponding priors are also shown in Figure 3.
4.5 General Exponential Families
The contingency table setting is an instance of a test between two nested (conditional) ex-
ponential families. We can extend the approach of defining GROW sets Θ() relative to
distance measures d and numerically calculating corresponding JIPrs (PW ∗1 , PW ∗0 ) straightfor-
wardly to this far more general setting. As long as Theorem 1, Part 3 can be applied with
W ′1 =W(Θ()), the resulting Bayes factor pW ∗1 (Y)/pW ∗0 (Y) will be a GROW e-variable. The
main condition for Part 3 is the requirement that D(PW ′1‖PW ∗0 ) < ∞ for all W ′ ∈ W(Θ()),
which automatically holds if D(Pθ‖PW ∗0 ) <∞ for all θ ∈ Θ(). Since, for exponential families,
D(Pθ‖Pθ′) <∞ for all θ, θ′ in the interior of the parameter space Θ = Θ1, this condition can
often be enforced to hold though, if we take a divergence measure d such that for each  > 0,
Θ() is a compact subset of Θ1 and for each θ ∈ Θ1 that is not on the boundary, there is an
 > 0 such that θ ∈ Θ().
For large n though, numerical calculation of GROW e-variables may be time consuming,
and one may wonder whether there exists other nontrivial (but perhaps not GROW, or at least
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Figure 3: The Lemon: Graphical depiction of the KL-divergence based GROW Θ().
not GROW relative to any intuitive sets Θ()) e-variables that take less computational effort.
It turns out that these exist: one can calculate a conditional GROW-e-variable. We illustrate
this for the contingency table setting. Fix an arbitrary function g mapping x to W(Θ1), the
set of priors on Θ1. Conditional on the sufficient statistic relative to H0, µˆ1(Y) = N1/n, all
distributions in H0 assign the same probability mass p0(y | µˆ1(y)) = 1/
(
n
N1
)
to all y with
µˆ1(y) = µˆ1(Y). The conditional e-variable based on g is then given by
E =
pg(x)(Y | µˆ1(Y),x)
p0(Y | µˆ1(Y)) =
(
n
N1
)
· pg(x)(Y | x)
pg(x)(µˆ1(Y) | x)
. (33)
This gives a conditional (and hence also unconditional) e-variable for every choice of function
g(x). In fact it coincides with what has been called a method for obtaining ‘clean’ evidence
for the 2×2 table setting by eliminating the nuisance parameter µˆ1 (Royall, 1997). In settings
with optional stopping based on the value of µˆ1, it has a GROW-like optimality property for
certain choices of g which we will further explore in future work. In settings with fixed n, it is
not GROW and may perhaps be seen as a ‘quick and dirty’ approach to design an e-variable.
It clearly can be extended to any combination of H1 (not necessarily an exponential family)
and any exponential family H0 such that the ML estimator θˆ0(y) is almost surely well-defined
under all P ∈ H0, whereas at the same time, θˆ0(Y) is a sufficient statistic for H0, i.e. there is a
1-to-1 correspondence between the ML estimator θˆ0(Y) and the sufficient statistic φ(Y). This
will hold for most exponential families encountered in practice (to be precise, H0 has to be
a regular or ‘aggregate’ (Barndorff-Nielsen, 1978, page 154-158) exponential family). In such
cases, if, for example, a reasonable prior W1 on Θ1 is available, we can efficiently calculate
nontrivial e-variables based on taking g(x) = W1, but whether these are sufficiently strong
approximations of the GROW e-variable will have to be determined on a case-by-case, i.e.
model-by-model basis; we did some experiments for the contingency table, with W1 a Beta
prior, and there we found them to be noncompetitive in terms of GROW and power with
respect to the full JIPr1.
1Although it was not connected to e-variables, the idea to modify Bayes factors for nested exponential
27
5 Testing Our GROW Tests
We perform some initial experiments with GROW e-variables for composite H0 nested within
H1. We consider two common settings: in one setting, we want to perform the most sensitive
test possible for a given sample size n; we illustrate this with the contingency table test. In
the second setting, we are given a minimum clinically relevant effect size δ and we want to
find the smallest sample size n for which we can expect good statistical (power) properties.
5.1 Case 1: Fixed n,  unknown
Mini-Simulation-Study 1: The 2x2 Table We first consider the GROW e-variables
E∗Θ(δ) relative to parameter of interest δ = |µ1|a−µ1|b|, the first option considered in Section 4.4.
For a grid of δ’s in the range [0.4, 0.9] we looked at the best power that can be achieved by
GROW e-variable E∗Θ(δ∗), i.e. we looked for the δ
∗ (again taken from a grid in the range
[0.4, 0.9]) such that
1− β(δ, δ∗) := inf
θ∈Θ((δ))
Pθ
(
logE∗Θ((δ∗)) ≥ − logα
)
(34)
is maximized. We summarized the results in Table 2. We see that, although we know of no
δ gr(Θ(δ)) = D(PW ∗1 ‖PW ∗0 ) δ∗ power 1− β¯
0.42 1.20194 0.50 0.20
0.46 1.57280 0.50 0.29
0.50 1.99682 0.50 0.39
0.55 2.47408 0.50 0.49
0.59 3.00539 0.50 0.60
0.63 3.59327 0.50 0.69
0.67 4.23919 0.50 0.77
0.71 4.94988 0.50 0.85
0.75 5.73236 0.50 0.91
Table 2: Relating δ, δ∗, power and capital growth gr(Θ(δ)) for na = nb = 10 for the GROW
e-variables. For example, the row with 0.42 in the first column corresponds to the two black
lines in Figure 2 which represent all θ1 = (µ1|a, µ1|b) with δ = 0.42.
analogue to Johnson’s Theorem 2 here, something like a “uniformly most powerful δ-GROW
safe test” does seem to exist — it is given by E∗Θ(δ∗) with δ
∗ = 0.50; and we can achieve power
0.8 for all θ ∈ Θ(δ) with δ ' 0.5. The same exercise is repeated with the GROW e-variables
defined relative to the KL divergence in Table 3, again indicating that there is something
like a uniformly most powerful δ-GROW safe test. We now compare four hypothesis tests for
contingency tables for the na = nb = 10 design: Fisher’s exact test (with significance level
α = 0.05), the default Bayes Factor for contingency tables (Gunel and Dickey, 1974, Jamil
families by conditioning on the smaller model’s sufficient statistic was communicated to us by T. Seidenfeld
(2016).
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log n gr(Θ()) = D(PW ∗1 ‖PW ∗0 ) logn∗ power
2 0.21884 16 0.06
5 0.98684 16 0.18
10 1.61794 16 0.29
15 1.99988 16 0.35
20 2.27332 16 0.40
25 2.48597 16 0.44
30 2.65997 16 0.47
40 2.93317 16 0.52
50 3.14447 16 0.55
100 3.78479 16 0.65
200 4.48606 16 0.74
300 4.86195 16 0.79
400 5.12058 16 0.82
Table 3: Relating , ∗, power and capital growth gr(Θ()) for na = nb = 10 for the KL-
GROW e-variables. For example, the row with 20 in the first column corresponds to the two
curved red lines in Figure 3 which represent all θ1 = (µ1|a, µ1|b) with infµ∈[0,1]D(Pθ1‖Pµ) =
log 20.
et al., 2016) (which is turned into a test by rejecting if the Bayes factor ≥ 20 = − logα),
the ‘uniformly most powerful’ GROW e-variable E∗Θ(δ∗) with δ
∗ = 0.50 (see Table 2) which
we call GROW(Θ(δ)) and the ‘uniformly most powerful’ KL-GROW e-variable E∗Θ(∗) with
∗ = log 16 (see Table 3) which we call (Θ()). The 0.8-iso-power lines are depicted in Figure 4;
for example, if θ1 = (µ1|a, µ1|b) is on or outside the two curved red lines, then Fisher’s exact
test achieves power 0.8 or higher. The difference between the four tests is in the shape: Bayes
and the δ-based JIPr yield almost straight power lines, the KL-based JIPr and Fisher curved.
Fisher gives a power ≥ 0.8 in a region larger than the KL-based JIPr, which makes sense
because the corresponding test is not safe; the δ-GROW and default Bayes factor behave very
similarly, but they are not the same: in larger-scale experiments we do find differences. We
see similar figures if we compare the rejection regions rather than the iso-power lines of the
four tests (figures omitted).
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Figure 4: 0.8-iso-powerlines for the four different tests.
5.2 Case 2: n to be determined, δ known
Consider δ-GROW e-variables for some scalar parameter of interest δ. Whereas in Case 1,
the goal was implicitly to detect the ‘smallest detectable deviation’ from H0, in Case 2 we
know beforehand that we are only really interested in rejecting H0 if δ ≥ δ. Here δ > 0 is
the minimum value at which the statement ‘|δ| ≥ δ’ has any practical repercussions. This is
common in medical testing in which one talks about the minimum clinically relevant effect
size δ.
Assuming that generating data costs money, we would like to find the smallest possible n
at which we have a reasonable chance of detecting that |δ| ≥ δ. Proceeding analogously to
Case 1, we may determine, for given significance level α and desired power 1−β, the smallest
n at which there exist δ∗ such that the safe test based on e-variable E∗Θ(δ∗) has power at least
1 − β for all θ ∈ Θ(δ). Again, both n and δ∗ may have to be determined numerically (note
that δ∗ is not necessarily equal to δ).
Mini-Simulation-Study 2: 1-Sample t-test In this simulation study, we test whether
the mean of a normal distribution is different from zero, when the variance is unknown. We
determine, for a number of tests, the minimum n needed as a function of minimal effect size
δ to achieve power at least 0.8 when rejecting at significance level α = 0.05. We compare the
classical t-test, the Bayesian t-test (with Cauchy prior on δ, turned into a test that is safe
under optional continuation by rejecting when BF ≥ 20 = 1/α) and our safe test based on
the GROW e-variable E∗Θ(δ∗)〈V n〉 = E∗δ∗〈V n〉 that maximizes power while having a GROW
property. For the standard t-test we can just compute the required (batch) sample size. This
is plotted (black line) in Figure 5 as a function of δ, where we also plot the corresponding
required sample sizes for the Bayesian t-test (larger by a factor of around 1.9 − 2.1) and our
maximum power δ∗-GROW t-test (larger by a factor of around 1.4− 1.6).
However, these three lines do not paint the whole picture: we have already indicated in
Section 4.3 that for any prior W [δ], the threshold test based on (E∗W [δ]〈V i〉)i∈N is safe also
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under optional stopping. Since both the Bayesian t-test and our δ-GROW t-test are an instance
of E∗W [δ] as given by (29), we preserve Type-I error guarantees if we stop at the smallest t at
which E∗W [δ]〈V t〉 > 20 = 1/α. We can now compute an effective sample size under optional
stopping in two steps, for given δ. First, we determine the smallest n at which the δ∗-GROW
e-variable E∗Θ(δ∗) which optimizes power achieves a power of at least 0.8 = 1− β; we call this
nmax. We then draw data sequentially and record the E∗W [δ]〈V t〉 until either this e-variable
exceeds 1/α or t = nmax. This new procedure still has Type I error at most α, and it must
have power ≥ 0.8. The ‘effective sample size’ is now the sample size we expect if data are
drawn from a distribution with effect size at δ and we do optional stopping in the above
manner (‘stopping’ includes both the occasions on which H0 is accepted and t = nmax, and
the occasions when H0 is rejected and t ≤ nmax). In Figure 5 we see that this effective sample
size is almost equal to the fixed sample size we need with the standard t-test to obtain the
required power. Thus, quite unlike the classical t-test, our δ-GROW t-test e-variable preserves
Type I error probabilities under optional stopping; it needs more data than the classical t-test
in the worst-case, but hardly more on average under H1. For a Neyman-Pearsonian hypothesis
tester, this should be a very good reason to adopt it!
6 Earlier, Related and Future Work
e-Variables, Test Martingales, General Novelty As seen in Section 2, e-variables are
close cousins of test martingales, which go back to Ville (1939), the paper that introduced
the modern notion of a martingale. e-variables themselves have probably been originally in-
troduced by Levin (of P vs NP fame) (1976) (see also (Gács, 2005)) under the name test of
randomness, but Levin’s abstract context is quite different from ours. Independently discov-
ered by Zhang et al. (2011), they were later analyzed by Shafer et al. (2011), Shafer and Vovk
(2019), Vovk and Wang (2019); all these authors used different names for the concept. While
we originally called them ‘S-value’, the paper (Vovk and Wang, 2019), which appeared after
the first version of the present paper, called them e-variables, a name which we decided to
adopt for its better motivation (e can stand both for expectation, just like the p in p-value
stands for probability; but also for ‘evidence’).
Test martingales themselves have been thoroughly investigated by Shafer et al. (2011),
Shafer and Vovk (2019). They themselves underlie AV (anytime-valid) p-values (Johari et al.,
2015), AV tests (which we call ‘tests that are safe for optional stopping’) and AV confidence
sequences. The latter were recently developed in great generality by A. Ramdas and collab-
orators; see e.g. (Balsubramani and Ramdas, 2016, Howard et al., 2018a,b). Both AV tests
and confidence sequences have first been developed by H. Robbins and his students (Darling
and Robbins, 1967, Lai et al., 1976, Robbins, 1970). Like we do for e-variables, Ramdas et al.
(and also e.g. Pace and Salvan (2019)) stress the promise of the AV notions for a safer kind
of statistics that is significantly more robust than standard testing and confidence interval
methodology.
Just like regular tests can be turned into confidence intervals by varying the null and ‘in-
verting’ the resulting tests, AV confidence intervals can be created by starting with a collection
of test martingales, one for each null, and then varying the null and inverting the AV test based
on the test martingale for each null. We can do (and plan to investigate in future work) the
same thing with e-variables. More generally, the work on AV tests and confidence sequences
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Figure 5: Effective sample size for the classical t-test (black), Bayesian t-test (e-test with
Cauchy prior on δ) (red), and the δ-GROW e-test E∗ with a two-point prior on δ (blue).
The lines denoted batch denote the smallest fixed sample size at which power β = 0.8 can be
obtained under H1 as a function of the ‘true’ effect size δ. The continuous lines, denoted ‘o.s.’
denote the sample size needed if optional stopping (see main text) is done (and for E∗, the
prior is optimized for the batch sizes that were plotted as well. The ratios between the curves
at δ = 0.5 and the batch sample size needed for the t-test is 0.9 (E∗ with o.s.), 1.1 (Bayes
t-test with o.s.), 1.5 (E∗ with fixed sample size) and 1.9 (Bayes t-test with fixed sample size).
At δ = 1 they are 0.98, 1.26, 1.61 and 2.01 respectively: the amount of data needed compared
with the tradition t-test thus increases in δ within the given range. The two lines indicated as
‘nmax (o.s.)’ are explained in the main text.
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is very similar in spirit to ours, with our work stressing analysis at the level of batches of data
rather than individual data points. Thus, we do not claim any real novelty for the ‘safe’ or
‘always valid’ setting. The real novelty is in Theorem 1 and 3. However, as we discovered
after posting the first version of the present paper, a special case of Theorem 1 was already
formulated and proved2 by Zhang et al. (2011) (see also (Zhang, 2013)) who show that GROW
e-variables can be constructed for discrete outcome spaces, simple (singleton) H1 and convex
H0. Theorem 1 extends this to its full generality, showing that nontrivial e-variables always
exist and that optimal ones can often be constructed, for nonconvex H0 and H1 that are both
composite — that insight is the main novelty of this paper.
Relation to Sequential Testing Sequential testing (Lai, 2009), pioneered by Wald and
Barnard and developed much further by H. Robbins and his students, is mathematically
similar to testing based on test martingales and (therefore) e-variables. Sequential tests are
based on random processes (Si)i∈N that are a likelihood ratio of (potentially coarsened) data
under all P in both H0 and H1. By this we mean that there is a coarsening {Vi} of the
{Yi} so that both the null and the alternative are simple for data coarsened to {Vi}, as in
Proposition 3, so that for each n, all distributions in P0 ∈ H0 induce the same distribution
Q0[Vn] on V n with density q′0, and all distributions P1 ∈ H1 induce the same distribution
Q1[V
n] on V n with density q′1, and Sn = q′1(V n)/q′0(V n). The setting can be extended to the
case where H0 contains additional distributions in H0 and H1, as long as for all P0 ∈ H0,
Q0[Sn], the marginal distribution of Sn under Q0[Vn], stochastically dominates P0[Vn], and
under all P1 ∈ H1, Q1[S−1n ], the marginal distribution of 1/Sn under Q1[Vn], stochastically
dominates P1[Vn].
For such likelihood ratio processes, S1, S2, . . . has the property of being a test martingale
under both H0 and (after inversion) under H1. The sequential test based on S1, S2, . . . with
prespecified parameters α, β proceeds by calculating S1, S2, . . . and stopping at τ∗, the smallest
τ at which either Sτ ≥ (1 − β)/α (‘accept’) or Sτ ≤ (1 − α)/β (‘reject’). Wald showed that
this test has Type I error probability bounded by α and Type II error bounded by β. The
reason one can stop at a smaller threshold ((1−β)/α rather than 1/α) is that one has to stop
at τ∗, Thus, the method does not allow for optional stopping in our sense: the probability
that there is some n with Sn ≥ (1− β)/α is strictly larger than α.
Still, since S1, S2, . . . forms a test martingale under H0, it can be used to generate useful
e-values as explained in Section 2.1. Thus, much of the work in sequential testing can be re-
cycled to obtain test martingales and e-values. Of course, as discussed in that section, not all
useful (δ-GROW) e-variables derive from martingales, let alone from ‘two-sided’ martingales.
Conditional Frequentist Tests In a series of papers starting with the landmark (Berger
et al., 1994), Berger, Brown, Wolpert (BBW) and collaborators, extending initial ideas by
Kiefer (1977) develop a theory of frequentist conditional testing that “in spirit” is very similar
to ours (see also Wolpert (1996), Berger (2003)) — one can view the present paper as a
radicalization of the BBW stance. Yet in practice there are important differences. For example,
our link between posteriors and Type I error is slightly different (Bayes factors, i.e. posterior
ratios vs. posterior probabilities), in our approach there are no ‘no-decision regions’, in the
2Zhang et al. (2011) was in turn inspired by Van Dam et al. (2005), co-authored by one of us, which identifies
the importance of the KL divergence in test design but falls short of defining e-values.
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BBW papers there is no direct link to optional continuation.
Related Work on Relating p-values and e-variables Shafer and Vovk (2019) give a
general formula for calibrators f . These are decreasing functions f : [0, 1]→ [0,∞] so that for
any p-value P , E := 1/f(P ) is an e-variable. Let fvs(P ) := −eP logP , a quantity sometimes
called the Vovk-Sellke bound (Bayarri et al., 2016)), having roots in earlier work by by Vovk
(1993) and Sellke et al. (Sellke et al., 2001). All calibrators satisfy limP↓0 f(P )/fvs(P ) =
∞, and calibrators f advocated in practice additionally satisfy, for all P ≤ 1/e, f(P ) ≥
fvs(P ). For example, for any calibrator f suggested for practice, rejection under the safe test
with significance level α = 0.05, so that E ≥ 20, would then correspond to reject only if
P ≤ f−1(0.05) > f−1vs (0.05) ≈ 0.0032, requiring a substantial amount of additional data for
rejection under a given alternative. Note that the e-variables we developed for given models
in previous sections are more sensitive than such generic calibrators though. For example, in
Section 1.3 the threshold 2.72/
√
n corresponding to α = 0.05 corresponds roughly to p = 0.007,
a factor 2 larger. Experiments in the master’s study (Hu, 2020) indicate a similar phenomenon
for nonparametric tests: GROW e-values designed specifically for a given H0 and H1 achieve
higher growth rate and higher power than calibration e-values based on standard p-values for
these H0 and H1.
Related Work: Testing based on Data-Compression and MDL
Example 4. Ryabko and Monarev (2005) show that bit strings produced by standard random
number generators can be substantially compressed by standard lossless data compression
algorithms such as zip, which is a clear indication that the bits are not so random after all.
Thus, the null hypothesis states that data are ‘random’ (independent fair coin flips). They
measure ‘amount of evidence against H0 provided by data y = y1, . . . , yn’ as
n− Lzip(y),
where Lzip(y) is the number of bits needed to code y using (say) zip. Now, define p¯1(y) =
2−Lzip(y). Via Kraft’s inequality (Cover and Thomas, 1991) one can infer that
∑
y∈{0,1}n p¯1(y) ≤
1 (for this particular case, see the extended discussion by (Grünwald, 2007, Chapter 17)). At
the same time, for the null we have H0 = {P0}, where P0 has mass function p0 with for each
n, y ∈ {0, 1}, p0(y) = 2−n. Defining E := p¯1(Y)/p0(Y) we thus find
EY∼P0 [E] =
∑
y∈{0,1}n
p¯1(y) ≤ 1 ; logE = n− Lzip(Y).
Thus, the Ryabko-Monarov codelength difference is the logarithm of an e-variable. Note that
in this example, there is no clearly defined alternative; being able to compress by zip simply
means that the null hypothesis is false; it certainly does not mean that the ‘sub-distribution’
p¯1 is true (if one insists on there being an alternative, one could view p¯1 as a representative
of a nonparametric H1 consisting of all distributions P1 with EY∼P1 [logE] > 0, a truly huge
and not so intuitive set).
More generally, by the same reasoning, for singleton H0 = {P0}, any test statistic of the
form p¯1(Y)/p0(Y), with p0 the density of P0 and p¯1 a density or sub-density (integrating
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to less than 1) is an e-variable. Such e-variables have been considered extensively within the
Minimum Description Length (MDL) and prequential approaches to model selection (Rissanen,
1989, Dawid, 1997, Barron et al., 1998, Grünwald and Roos, 2020). In these approaches there
usually is a clearly defined alternative H1, so that a Bayesian would choose p¯1 := pW1 to be a
Bayes marginal density. In contrast, the MDL and prequential approach allow more freedom
in the choice of p¯1. MDL merely requires p¯1 to be a ‘universal distribution’ such as a Bayes
marginal, a normalized maximum likelihood, prequential plug-in or a ‘switch’ distribution
(Grünwald, 2007). With simple H0, all such ‘MDL factors’ also constitute e-variables; but
with composite H0, just as with Bayes factors, the standard MDL approach may fail to deliver
e-variables.
Future Work, Open Problems In Section 3.3 we indicated that standard δ-GROW e-
variables often turn out to be ‘simple’ (and therefore easy to implement): they are defined to
be GROW relative to a large set, but they end up as Bayes factors pW ∗1 /pW ∗0 in which W
∗
1
puts all mass on the boundary of Θ1. We aim to investigate the generality of this phenomenon
in future work.
We already indicated that it may be possible to extend Theorem 3 to show that the Bayes
factor based on the right Haar prior can be GROW in more general group invariant settings;
showing or disproving this is a major goal for future work. Also, just as we propose to fully
base testing on a method that has a sequential gambling/investment interpretation, Shafer and
Vovk have suggested, even more ambitiously, to base the whole edifice of probability theory on
sequential-gambling based game theory rather than measure theory (Shafer and Vovk, 2001,
2019); see also (Shafer, 2019) who emphasizes the ease of the betting interpretation. Obviously
our work is related, and it would be of interest to understand the connections more precisely.
7 A Theory of Hypothesis Testing
7.1 A Common Currency for Testers adhering Jeffreys’, Neyman’s and
Fisher’s Testing Philosophies
The three main approaches towards null hypothesis testing are Jeffreys’ Bayes factor methods,
Fisher’s p-value-based testing and the Neyman-Pearson method. Berger (2003), based on ear-
lier work, e.g. (Berger et al., 1994), was the first to note that, while these three methodologies
seem superficially highly contradictory, there exist methods that have a place within all three.
Our proposal is in the same spirit, yet more radical; it also differs in many technical respects
from Berger’s. Let us briefly summarize how e-variables and the corresponding safe tests can
be fit within the three paradigms:
Concerning the Neyman-Pearson approach: e-variables lead to tests with Type-I error
guarantees at any fixed significance level α, which is the first requirement of a Neyman-Pearson
test. The second requirement is to use the test that maximizes power. But we can use GROW
e-variables designed to do exactly this, as we illustrated in Section 5. The one difference to the
NP approach is that we optimize power under the constraint that the e-variable is GROW —
which is essential to make the results of various tests of the same null easily combinable, and
preserve Type I error probabilities under optional stopping. Note though that this constraint
is major: as shown in Example 1, the standard NP tests lead to useless e-variables under the
GROW criterion.
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Concerning the Fisherian approach: we have seen that e-variables can be reinterpreted as
(quite) conservative p-values. But much more importantly within this discussion, e-variables
can be defined, and have a meaningful (monetary) interpretation, even if no clear (or only
a highly nonparametric/nonstationary) alternative can be defined. This was illustrated in the
data compression setting of Example 4. Thus, in spirit of Fisher’s philosophy, we can use
e-variables to determine whether there is substantial evidence against H0, without predeter-
mining any alternative: we simply postulate that the larger E, the more evidence against H0
without having specific frequentist error guarantees. The major difference though is that these
e-variables continue to have a clear (monetary) interpretation even if we multiply them over
different tests, and even if the decision whether or not to perform a test (gather additional
data) depends on the past.
Concerning the Bayesian approach: despite their monetary interpretation, all e-variables
that we encountered can also be written as likelihood ratios, although (e.g. in Example 4 or
Section 4.5) either H0 or H1 may be represented by a distribution that is different from a
Bayes marginal distribution. Still, all GROW (optimal) e-variables we encountered are in fact
equivalent to Bayes factors, and Theorem 1 Part 3 strongly suggests that this is a very general
phenomenon. While the point priors arising in the δ-GROW e-variables may be quite different
from priors commonly adopted in the Bayesian literature, one can also obtain e-variables by
using priors on H1 that do reflect prior knowledge or beliefs — we elaborate on this under
Hope vs. Belief below.
The Dream With the massive criticisms of p-values in recent years, there seems a consen-
sus that p-values should be used not at all or, at best, with utter care (Wasserstein et al.,
2016, Benjamin et al., 2018), but otherwise, the disputes among adherents of the three schools
continue — intuitions among great scientists still vary dramatically. For example, some highly
accomplished statisticians reject the idea of testing without a clear alternative outright; others
say that such goodness-of-fit tests are an essential part of data analysis. Some insist that sig-
nificance testing should be abolished altogether (Amrhein et al., 2019), others (perhaps slightly
cynically) acknowledge that significance may be silly in principle, yet insist that journals and
conferences will always require a significance-style ‘bar’ in practice and thus such bars should
be made as meaningful as possible. Finally, within the Bayesian community, the Bayes factor
is sometimes presented as a panacea for most testing ills, while others warn against its use,
pointing out for example that with different default priors that have been proposed, one can
get quite different answers.
Wouldn’t it be nice if all these accomplished but disagreeing people could continue to go
their way, yet would have a common language or ‘currency’ to express amounts of evidence,
and would be able to combine their results in a meaningful way? This is what e-variables can
provide: consider three tests with the same null hypothesis H0, based on samples Y(1), Y(2)
and Y(3) respectively. The results of a δ-based e-variable test aimed to optimize power on
sample Y(1), an e-variable test for sample Y(2) based on a Bayesian prior W1 on H1 and a
Fisherian e-variable test in which the alternative H1 is not explicitly formulated, can all be
multiplied — and the result will be meaningful.
Hope vs. Belief In a purely Bayesian set-up, optional stopping is justified if θ viewed as
a random variable is independent of the stopping time N under the prior W . In that case, a
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celebrated result going back to Barnard (1947) (see Hendriksen et al. (2018) for an overview)
says that the posterior does not depend on the stopping rule used; hence it does not matter
how N was determined (as long as it does not depend on future data). If Bayes factors are
‘local’, based on priors that depend on the design and thus on the sample size n, then, from a
purely Bayesian perspective, optional (early) stopping is not allowed: since the prior depends
on n, when stopping at the first T < n at which pW1(yT )/pW0(yT ) > 20, neither the original
prior based on the fixed n nor the prior based on the observed T (which treats the random T
as fixed in advance) is correct any more. This happens, for example, for the default (Gunel
and Dickey, 1974) Bayes factors for 2× 2 contingency tables advocated by Jamil et al. (2016)
— from a Bayesian perspective, these do not allow for optional stopping.
The same holds for the UMP Bayes factors that we considered in Section 4.1. These
generally are ‘local’, the prior W1 (and, presuming the idea can be extended to composite
H0, potentially also W0) depending on the sample size n. For example, for the 1-sided test
with the normal location family, Example 2, we set all prior mass on µ˜n =
√
2(− logα)/n;
a similar dependence holds for the prior on δ∗ in the δ∗-based GROW t-test if we choose δ∗
to maximize power. Thus, while from a purely Bayesian perspective such e-variables/Bayes
factors are not suitable for optional stopping, in Section 4, both the δ-based GROW e-variable
for the normal location family and for the t-test setting do allow for optional stopping under
our definition: one may also stop and report the Bayes factor at any time one likes during the
experiment, and still Type I error probabilities are preserved (Hendriksen et al., 2018). This
is what we did in the experiment of Figure 5: the pre-determined n (called there nmax) on
which the prior W1 on δ (that puts mass 1/2 on δ∗, and 1/2 on −δ∗) is based is determined
there such that, if we stop at any fixed T = n′, the statistical power of the test is optimal if
n′ = nmax; but the likelihood ratio e(Y T ) := pW1(Y T )/pW0(Y T ) remains an e-variable even
if T = n′ 6= nmax or even if one stops at the first T ≤ nmax such that E(Y T ) ≥ 20. Thus,
we should make a distinction between prior beliefs as they arise in Bayesian approaches, and
what one may call ‘prior hope’ as it arises in the e-variable approach. The purely Bayesian
approach relies on the beliefs being, in some sense, adequate. In the e-variable based approach,
one can use priors that represent subjective a priori assessments; for example, in the Bayesian
t-test, one can use any prior W1 on δ one likes as long as it has more than two moments,
and still the resulting Bayes factor with the right Haar prior on σ will be a GROW e-variable
(Theorem 3). If H1 is the case, and the data behave as one would expect according to the prior
W1, then the e-variable will tend to be large – it GROWs fast. But if the data come from a
distribution in H1 in a region that is very unlikely under W1, E(Y) will tend to be smaller —
but it is still an e-variable, hence leads to valid Type-I error guarantees and can be interpreted
when multiplied across experiments. Thus, from the e-variable perspective, the prior on W1
represents something more like ‘hope’ than ‘belief’ — if one is lucky and data behave like W1
suggests, one gets better results; but one still gets valid and safe results even if W1 is chosen
badly (corresponds to false beliefs).
This makes the e-variable approach part of what is perhaps among the most under-
recognized paradigms in statistics and machine learning: methods supplying results that have
frequentist validity under a broad range of conditions (in our case: as long as H0 or H1 is
correct), but that can give much stronger results if one is ‘lucky’ on the data at hand (e.g. the
data matches the prior). It is, for example, the basis of the so-called PAC-Bayesian approach
to classification in machine learning (McAllester, 1998, Grünwald and Mehta, 2019), which
itself, via Shawe-Taylor and Williamson (1997), can be traced back to be inspired by the con-
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ditional testing approach of Kiefer (1977) that also inspired the BBW approach to testing. It
also connects to the general idea of ‘safe’ inference (Grünwald, 2000, Grünwald, 2018).
7.2 Possible Objections
By the nature of the subject, the relevance of this work is bound to be criticized. We would
like to end this paper by briefly anticipating three potential criticisms.
Where does all this leave the poor practitioner? A natural question is, whether the
e-variable based approach is not much too difficult and mathematical. Although the present,
initial paper is quite technical, we feel the approach in general is in fact easier to understand
than any approach based on p-values. The difficulty is that one has to explain it to researchers
who have grown up with p-values — we are confident that, to researchers who neither know p-
values nor e-variables, the e-variables are easier to explain, via the direct analogy to gambling.
Also, we suggested δ-based ‘default’ e-variables that (unlike some default Bayes factors) can
be used in absence of strong prior knowledge about the problem yet still have a valid monetary
interpretation and valid Type I Error guarantees. Finally, if, as suggested above, practitioners
really were to be forced, when starting an analysis, to think about optional stopping, optional
continuation and misspecification — this would make life difficult, but would make practice
all the better.
No Binary Decisions, Part I: Removing Significance There is a growing number of
influential researchers who hold that the whole concept of ‘significance’, and ensuing binary
‘reject’ or ‘accept’ decisions, should be abandoned altogether (see e.g. the 800 co-signatories of
the recent Amrhein et al. (2019), or the call to abandon significance by McShane et al. (2019)).
This paper is not the place to take sides in this debate, but we should stress that, although
we strongly emphasized Type-I and Type-II error probability bounds here, e-variables still
have a meaningful interpretation, as amount of evidence measured in monetary terms, even if
one never uses them to make binary decisions; and we stress that, again, this monetary inter-
pretation remains valid under optional continuation, also in the absence of binary decisions.
We should also stress here that we do not necessarily want to adopt ‘uniformly most powerful
e-variables, even though our comparison to Johnson’s uniformly most powerful Bayes tests in
Section 4 and the experiments in Section 5 might perhaps suggest this. Rather, our goal is
to advocate using GROW e-variables relative to some prior W on Θ1 or a subset of Θ(δ) of
Θ1 — the GROW criterion leaves open some details, and our point in these experiments is
merely to compare our approach to classical, power-optimizing Neyman-Pearson approaches
— to obtain the sharpest comparison, we decided to fill in the details (the prior W on Θ(δ))
for which the two approaches (e-variables vs. classical testing) behave most similarly.
No Binary Decisions, Part II: Towards Safe Confidence Intervals Another group
of researchers (e.g. Cumming (2012)) has been advocating for generally replacing testing by
estimation accompanied by confidence intervals; or, more generally (McShane et al., 2019),
that researchers should always provide an analysis of the behavior of and uncertainty inherent
in one or more estimators for the given data. While we sympathize with the latter point of
view, we stress that standard confidence intervals (as well as other measures of uncertainty
of estimators such as standard errors) suffer from a similar problem as p-values: they are
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not safe under optional continuation. The aforementined anytime-valid confidence sequences
developed by Lai and later Ramdas and collaborators (Lai et al., 1976, Howard et al., 2018a,b)
do allow for optional stopping and hence, if subsequent experimenters keep using the same
underlying test martingales, optional continuation. We strongly feel that if one really wants to
replace testing by confidence approaches, one should adopt anytime-valid rather than standard
confidence intervals, even though the former ones are invariably a bit broader. In future work
we hope to study whether it is useful to consider ‘safe confidence intervals’, merely allowing
for optional continuation rather than optional stopping (at each data point).
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Appendix A Proof Preliminaries
In the next sections we prove our theorems. To make all statements in the main text mathe-
matically rigorous and their notations mutually compatible, we first provide a few additional
definitions and notation.
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Sample Spaces and σ-Algebras In all mathematical results and examples in the main
text, we tacitly make the following assumptions: all random elements mentioned in the main
text are defined on some measurable space (Ω,A). We assume that {Yi}i∈I and {Ri}i∈I are
two collections of measurable functions from Ω to measurable spaces (Y,A′) and (R,A′′)
respectively, where either I = {1, 2, . . . , nmax} for some finite nmax or I = N. We additionally
assume that each Yi takes values in Y ⊆ Rm for some finite m, and we equip (Ω,A) with the
filtration (Fi)i∈I where Fi is the σ-algebra generated by (Y i, Ri).
For each θ ∈ Θ := Θ0 ∪Θ1, in the unconditional case, Pθ is a distribution for the random
process (Yi)i∈I . In the conditional case, we assume finite I and existence of a fixed function
φ and another collection of functions {Xi}i∈I such that for all i ∈ I, Xi = φ(Ri), with Xi
taking values in some set X . For each xn ∈ X n, Pθ(· | Xn = xn) is then a distribution on
(Y1, . . . , Ynmax). We assume throughout that Pθ(Y n | Xn = xn) = Pθ(Y n | Xm = xm) for
every n,m > n, xm ∈ Xm: present data is independent of future covariates given present
covariates. Whenever we refer to a random variable such as Y without giving an index, it
stands for Y n = (Y1, . . . , Yn); similarly for all other time-indexed random variables.
We stated in the main text that we assume that the parameterization is 1-to-1. By this
we mean that for each θ, θ′ ∈ Θ with θ 6= θ′, the associated distributions are also different, so
that Pθ 6= Pθ′ . We also assume that Θ0 and Θ1 are themselves associated with appropriate
σ-algebras. In general, Θj need not be finite-dimensional, so we allow non-parametric settings.
(In)-Dependence and Densities In Section 2 on optional continuation we make no fur-
ther assumptions about Pθ. Specifically, the Yi need not be independent. In all other sections,
unless we explicitly state otherwise, we assume independence. Specifically, when the Pθ rep-
resent unconditional distributions, then we assume that the random variables Y1, Y2, . . . are
independent under each Pθ with θ ∈ Θ, and that for all i, the marginal distribution Pθ(Yi)
has a density relative to some underlying measure λ1. That is, we for each j we can write
pθ(Y
j) = pθ(Y1, . . . , Yj) =
∏j
i=1 p
′
θ,i(Yi) as a product density where p
′
θ,i is a density relative to
λ1. In all our examples, λ1 is either a probability mass function on Y or a density on Y relative
to Lebesgue measure, but the theorems work for general λ1. Then pθ(Y) =
∏n
i=1 p
′
θ,i(Yi) is a
density relative to λ := λn, defined as the n-fold product measure of λ1.
With the exception of the contingency table setting of Section 4.4 and the conditional
exponential family setting that we briefly mentioned in Section 4.5 (the only sections in which
the Pθ are conditional (on x) distributions), we assume that the Yi are not just independent
but also identically distributed, hence p′θ,i = p
′
θ,1 for all i.
Notational Conventions When we mention a distribution Pθ without further qualification,
we mean that it is the distribution of Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) = Y n defined on Ω; and we use pθ
for its density as defined above. We sometimes refer to the marginal distribution of a random
variable U under Pθ, where U is a function (coarsening) of Y. We denote this distribution as
Pθ[U], and its density by p′θ(u1, . . . , un), avoiding the cumbersome pθ[U](u1, . . . , un).
We generically use E∗... to denote e-variables that are GROW relative to some prior, set, or
set of priors, e.g. E∗W1 , E
∗
Θ(Θ), E
∗
W1 , and so on. If we consider e-variables that can be written
as a function of a coarsened random variable V = f(Y), and that are also GROW on the
‘coarsened’ level of distributions on V rather than Y, then we write E∗...〈V〉. Thus, standard
GROW e-variables could equivalently be written as E∗...〈Y〉.
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Appendix B Optional Continuation with Side-Information
Proof of Proposition 2 Although Proposition 2 is easily proved using Doob’s optional
stopping theorem, it may be useful to give a direct proof:
Proof. (sketch) We first consider the case with Kstop = kmax. Under all Pθ, we have
E
[
E(k)
]
= E
[
eh(V 0)|τ(0),g(V 0)
(
V(1)
)
· . . . · eh(V(k−1))|τ(k−1),g(V(k−1))
(
V(k)
)]
= EV(1)∼PθEV(2)∼Pθ|V(1) . . .EV(k)∼Pθ|V(k−1)
[
eh(V 0)|τ(0),g(V 0)
(
V(1)
)
·
eh(V(1))|τ(1),g(V(1))
(
V(2)
)
· . . . · eh(V(k−1))|τ(k−1), g(V(k−1))
(
V(k)
)]
= EV(1)∼Pθ
[
eh(V 0)|τ(0),g(V 0)
(
V(1)
)
·EV(2)∼Pθ|V(1)
[
eh(V(1))|τ(1),g(V(1))
(
V(2)
)
·
. . . ·EV(k)∼Pθ|V(k−1)
[
eh(V(k−1))|τ(k−1), g(V(k−1))
(
V(k)
)]
. . .
]]
.
By definition of e-variables, all factors in the product are bounded by 1, and the result follows.
For generalKstop ≤ kmax, note that without loss of generality we may assume thatW contains
the parameter 1, where for all n,m, en|m,1 is the trivial e-variable en|m,1(vn+m) ≡ 1 for all
vn+m ∈ Vn+m. For any sequence v1, v2 . . . we modify g, h to g′, h′ recursively as follows: we
let h′(v(1)) := h(v(1)), h′(v(2)) = h(v(2)), . . ., similarly for g′ and g, until we reach the smallest
k such that g(v(k)) = stop. Then we set g′(vn) = g′(v1, . . . , vn) = 1 and h′(yn) = 1 for all
n ≥ τ(k) and all vn that are extensions of vτ(k) . The E′ based on the new g′, h′ will have
E′(kmax) = E(K). It follows from (a) that E′(kmax) is an e-variable, so the result follows.
Extending Proposition 2 We want to extend the proposition to allow for two possibilities,
First, the sample size for the j-th batch of data may be determined by a stopping time N(j),
which generalizes the N(j) used in the main text to the case that the sample size of the j-th
sample Y(j) is not fixed in advance. For example, in the 2× 2 table (Example 4.4) we might
continue sampling until we have obtained 10 new examples of category a. Second, we want
to model the idea of ‘side information’. For this, we assume we make additional observations
Z(0), Z(1), Z(2), . . .. The idea is that at the end of analyzing the k-th data batch Y(k), we also
get some side information Z(k) which may influence our decision whether or not to take into
account a new data batch Y(k+1). We want to make as few assumptions as possible about
this side-information; specifically, we will not assume that is itself of stochastic nature (i.e.
will assume no distribution on it), and the Z(k) may take values in an unspecified countable
set Z(k). Thus, whereas the data Y(k) can always be viewed as a vector (Yτ(k−1)+1, . . . , Yτ(k)),
we do not assume that Z(k) has such (or any other) sub-structure. To make this compatible
with the measure-theoretic setting of the previous section, we assume that all Z(j) are random
variables on (Ω,A). Whereas before, the filtration (Fi)i∈I was defined by setting Fi to be the
σ-algebra generated by (Y i, Ri), we now set Fi to be the σ-algebra generated by (Y i, Ri, Z(Ji))
where Ji is the largest J ≥ 0 such that τ(J) ≤ i, where τ(J) is defined as below. Since τ(0) = 0,
Ji is a measurable function. It represents ‘which batch sample size i is part of’. For example,
if the first batch has sample size N(1) = 5 and the second N(2) = 10, then, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5,
before observing Yi, the available information is Y i−1, Ri−1, Z(0). Then, for 6 ≤ i ≤ 10, we
are ‘in the second batch’, and the available information is Y i−1, Ri−1, Z(1). Afterwards, Z(2)
becomes available, and so on .
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As formalized in (35) below, we will assume that past outcomes may influence the value
of Z(k), but Z(k) should be independent of any future Y(k+j). Our optional continuation
result continues to hold irrespective of the actual definition of Z(k) and Z(k), as long as these
independences hold. Thus, we may think of Z(k) as encoding information that is difficult to
think of stochastically, such as ‘more money to perform future tests is available’. Still, the
confinements of classical probability theory (or rather the measure theory on which it is based)
force us to assume the existence of sets of possible outcomes Z(k), even if we do not need to
specify them. It seems that even this can be avoided by re-expressing the optional continuation
result in terms of the open protocols enabled by the Game-Theoretic Theory of Probability
due to Shafer and Vovk (2019); but that would really go beyond the scope of this paper.
Batch Stopping Times To further incorporate Z(k) into our framework together with
sample sizes N(j) that are not fixed in advance, we need a slight generalization of the idea
of stopping time and stopping rule. In our context, a stopping rule for the k-th batch with
start time t is a collection of functions f(k),t,i, i ∈ N, where f(k),t,i maps (Z(k−1), Xt+i, V t+i) to
{stop,continue} such that for every z ∈ Z(k−1), every sequence (x1, v1), (x2, v2), . . ., there
is an i > t such that
f(k),t,i(z, ((x1, v1), . . . , (xt+i, vt+i)) = stop.
Thus, we require stopping times that are finite on all sample paths rather than the more
usual ‘almost surely finite’ stopping times because the Xi and Z(k) do not have a distribution
associated with them.
We now define τ(k) as the stopping time for the k-th batch in terms of stopping rules f(k)
defined above. We set τ(1) := N(1) to be the smallest i such that f(1),0,i(Z(0), Xi, V i) = stop,
and more generally, we set τ(k) to be τ(k−1) +N(k), where N(k) is the smallest i such that
f(k),τ(k−1),i(Z
(k−1), Xτ(k−1)+i, V τ(k−1)+i) = stop.
To make all required probabilities and expectations well-defined we set, for all i ≥ 1,
Pθ(Yτ(j)+1, . . . , Yτ(j)+i | Z(j),Y(j), Xτ(j)+i) := Pθ(Yτ(j)+1, . . . , Yτ(j)+i | Y(j), Xτ(j)+i). (35)
That is, according to all distributions Pθ under consideration, the ‘side-information’ Z(j)
available after the j-th data batch cannot influence future outcomes Yτ(j)+i; on the other
hand, the formulation allows that all data obtained up to and including Y(j) may influence
the side-information Z(j).
The definition below evidently generalizes (10), and the proposition evidently generalizes
Proposition 2:
Definition 3 (Conditional e-Variables). Let Xi, Yi, Vi and τ(1), . . . , τ(k) with 1 ≤ k ≤ kmax
be as above. Let E(k) be a nonnegative random variable that can be written as a function of
(X(k), V (k)). We call E(k) an e-variable for V(k) conditional on X(k),V(k−1) if it satisfies, for
all P ∈ H0,
EP [E(k) | X(k),V(k−1)] ≤ 1. (36)
Proposition 4. [Optional Continuation with Side-Information] Let τ(1), . . . , τ(k) with
k ≤ kmax and τ∗ be generalized stopping times as above such that on all sample paths, τ∗
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coincides with τ(j) for some j = 1..k. Let E(1), E(2), . . . , E(k) be a sequence of random variables
such that for each j = 1..k, E(j) is an e-variable for V(j) conditional on X(j),V(j−1). Let
the random variable Kstop be such that τ∗ = τ(Kstop). Then E
(Kstop) is an e-variable, so that
under all P0 ∈ H0, for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (11) of Proposition 2 and all its consequences hold.
Proof. (sketch) By (35), E(j) being an e-variable conditional on X(j),V(j−1) implies that
E(j) is also an e-variable conditional onX(j),V(j−1), Z(j−1). Then, since E(j−1) can be written
as a function of X(j−1),V(j−1), Z(j−1), we have, under all P ∈ H0, for j ≥ 1,
EP [E
(j) | X(j),V(j−1), Z(j−1)] = EP [E(j) · E(j−1) | X(j),V(j−1), Z(j−1)]
= EP [E(j) | X(j),V(j−1), Z(j−1)] · E(j−1) ≤ E(j−1),
where the final step is just the definition of conditional e-variable. This shows that the process
E(1), E(2), . . . constitutes a nonnegative supermartingale relative to the processX(1),V(0), Z(0),X(2),V(1), Z(1), . . ..
The result now follows by Doob’s optional stopping theorem.
Appendix C Elaborations and Proofs for Section 3
Meaning of “E∗ as defined by achieving (14) is essentially unique” Consider Θ′1 ⊂ Θ1
and Θ0, as in the main text in Section 3. Suppose that there exists an e-variable E∗ achieving
the infimum in (14). We say that E∗ is essentially unique if for any other e-variable E◦
achieving the infimum in (14), we have Pθ(E∗ = E◦) = 1, for all θ ∈ Θ′1 ∪ Θ0. Thus, if the
GROW e-variable exists and is essentially unique, any two GROW e-variables will take on
the same value with probability 1 under all hypotheses considered, and then we can simply
take one of these GROW e-variables and consider it the ‘unique’ one.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 1
For Part 1 of the result, we first need the following lemma. We call a measure Q on Ym
a sub-probability distribution if 0 < Q(Ym) ≤ 1. Note that the KL divergence D(P‖Q)
remains well-defined even if the measure Q is not a probability measure (e.g. Q could be
a sub-probability distribution or might not be integrable), as long as P and Q both have a
density relative to a common underlying measure (the definition of KL divergence does require
the first argument P to be a probability measure though).
Lemma 1. Let {QW : W ∈ W0} be a set of probability measures where each QW has a density
qw relative to some fixed underlying measure λ. Let Q be any convex subset of these pdfs.
Fix any pdf p (defined relative to measure λ) with corresponding probability measure P so that
infQ∈QD(P‖Q) <∞ and so that all Q ∈ Q are absolutely continuous relative to P . Then:
1. There exists a unique sub-distribution Q◦ with density q◦ such that
D(P‖Q◦) = inf
Q∈Q
D(P‖Q), (37)
i.e. Q◦ is the Reverse Information Projection of P on Q.
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2. For q◦ as above, for all Q ∈ Q, we have
EY∼Q
[
p(Y)
q◦(Y)
]
≤ 1. (38)
We note that we may have Q◦ 6∈ Q.
3. Let Q0 be a probability measure in Q with density q0. Then: the infimum in (37) is
achieved by Q0 ⇔ Q◦ = Q0 ⇔ (38) holds for q◦ = q0.
Proof. The existence and uniqueness of a measure Q◦ (not necessarily a probability measure)
with density q◦ that satisfies D(P‖Q◦) = infQ∈QD(P‖Q), and furthermore has the property
for all q that are densities of some Q ∈ Q: EY∼P
[
q(Y)
q◦(Y)
]
≤ 1. (39)
follows directly from (Li, 1999, Theorem 4.3). But by writing out the integral in the expecta-
tion explicitly we immediately see that we can rewrite (39) as:
for all Q ∈ Q: EY∼Q
[
p(Y)
q◦(Y)
]
≤ 1.
Li’s Theorem 4.3 still allows for the possibility that
∫
q◦(y) dλ(y) > 1. To see that in fact this
is impossible, i.e. q◦ defines a (sub-) probability density, use Lemma 4.5 of Li (1999). This
shows Part 1 and 2 of the lemma. The third part of the result follows directly from Lemma
4.1 of Li (1999)). (additional proofs of (extensions of) Li’s results can be found in the refereed
paper Grünwald and Mehta (2019)).
We shall now prove Theorem 1 itself. Throughout the proof, λ stands for the n-fold
product measure as defined in the introduction of this appendix, so that all distributions PW
with W ∈ W ′1 ∪W(Θ0) have a density pW relative to λ, and whenever we speak of a ‘density’
we mean ‘a density relative to λ’.
Proof of Theorem 1, Part 1 Let W0 := W(Θ0) and let Q = {PW : W ∈ W(Θ0)} and
P := PW1 . We see that Q is convex so we can apply Part 1 and 2 of the lemma above to P
and Q and we find that E∗W1 := pw1(Y)/q◦(Y) is an e-variable, and that it satisfies
EPW1
[
logE∗W1
]
= EPW1
[
log
pW1(Y)
q◦(Y)
]
= D (PW1‖Q◦) = inf
W0∈W(Θ0)
D (PW1‖PW0) ,
where the second equality is immediate and the third is from (37). It only remains to show
that (a)
sup
E∈E(Θ0)
EY∼PW1 [logE] ≤ EPW1
[
logE∗W1
]
and (b) that E∗W1 is essentially unique. To show (a), fix any e-variable E = e(Y) in E(Θ0). Now
further fix  > 0 and fix a W() ∈ W(Θ0) with D(PW1‖PW()) ≤ infW0∈W(Θ0)D(PW1‖PW0) +
. We must have, with q(y) := e(y)pW()(y), that
∫
q(y) dλ = EY∼PW() [E] ≤ 1, so q is a
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sub-probability density, and by the information inequality of information theory (Cover and
Thomas, 1991), it follows:
EPW1 [logE] = EPW1
[
log
q(Y)
pW()(Y)
]
≤
EPW1
[
log
pW1(Y)
pW()(Y)
]
= D(PW1‖PW()) ≤ inf
W0∈W(Θ0)
D(PW1‖PW0) + .
Since we can take  to be arbitrarily close to 0, it follows that
EPW1 [logE] ≤ infW0∈W(Θ0)D(PW1‖PW0) = EPW1 [logE
∗
W1 ],
where the latter equality was shown earlier. This shows (a).
To show essential uniqueness, let E be any e-variable with EPW1 [logE] = EPW1 [logE
∗
W1
].
By linearity of expectation, E′ = (1/2)E∗W1 + (1/2)E is then also an e-variable, and by
Jensen’s inequality applied to the logarithm we must haveEPW1 [logE
′] > EPW1 [logE
∗
W1
] unless
PW1(E = E
∗
W1
) = 1. Since we have already shown that for any e-variable E′, EPW1 [logE
′] ≤
EPW1 [logE
∗
W1
], it follows that PW1(E 6= E∗W1) = 0. But then, by our assumption of absolute
continuity, we also have Pθ0(E 6= E∗W1) = 0 so E∗W1 is essentially unique.
Proof of Theorem 1, Part 2 The general result of Part 2 (without the differentiability
condition imposed in the proof in the main text) is now a direct extension of Part 1 which
we just proved above: by Part 3 of the lemma above, we must have that Q◦ = PW ∗0 and
everything follows.
Proof of Theorem 1, Part 3 The proof consists of two sub-parts, Part 3(a) relying on
Part 1 above (and the RIPr-construction, which works for the case that W ′1 is a singleton),
Part 3(b) relying on a minimax theorem from Grünwald and Dawid (2004) (relying heavily on
an earlier result from Topsøe (1979)) that itself works for the case that Θ0 is a singleton.
Part 3(a). We show the following inequalities:
D(P
[V]
W ∗1
‖P [V]W ∗0 ) = infW1∈W ′1
inf
W0∈W0
D(PW1‖PW0) ≥ sup
E∈E(Θ0)
inf
W∈W ′1
EPW [logE] ≥ inf
W∈W ′1
EPW [logE
∗
W ′1 ].
(40)
The first equality follows by assumption of the Theorem. For the first inequality, note that by
Theorem 1, Part 1, we have for each fixed W1 ∈ W ′1 that
inf
W0∈W0
D(PW1‖PW0) = sup
E∈E(Θ0)
EPW1 [logE]
and this directly implies the inequality by a standard “inf sup ≥ sup inf” argument (the trivial
side of the minimax theorem). The second inequality is then immediate since E∗W ′1 ∈ E(Θ0).
Part (3(b). From (40) we see that it now suffices to show that
D(P
[V]
W ∗1
‖P [V]W ∗0 ) ≤ infW∈W ′1
EPW [logE
∗
W ′1 ], (41)
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where by the assumptions of the theorem we may assume that minW1∈W ′1 D(P
[V]
W1
‖P [V]W ∗0 ) =
D(P
[V]
W ∗1
‖P [V]W ∗0 ). Since all distributions occurring in (41) are marginals on V, and E
∗ can be
written as a function of V, we will from now on simply refer to the marginal densities on
V corresponding to PW as pW (rather than p′W as in the main text), and we will omit the
superscripts [V] from P ; thus we take as our basic outcome now V rather than Y.
We will show the stronger statement that (41) holds with equality. For this, let W ∗0 and
W ∗1 be as in the statement of the theorem. Let P be a probability measure that is absolutely
continuous with respect to P ∗W0 . Such P must have a density p and the logarithmic score of p
relative to measure PW ∗0 is defined, in the standard manner, as L(z, p) := − log p(v)/pW ∗0 (v),
which is P -almost surely finite, so that, following standard conventions for expectations of ran-
dom variables that are unbounded both from above and from below (see Grünwald and Dawid
(2004), Section 3.1), HW ∗0 (P ) := EV∼P [L(V, p)] = −D(P‖PW ∗0 ), the standard definition of
entropy relative to PW ∗0 , is well-defined and nonpositive.
We will apply the minimax Theorem 6.3 of (Grünwald and Dawid, 2004) with L as defined
above. For this, we need to verify Conditions 6.2–6.4 of that paper, where Γ in Condition 6.3
and 6.4 is set to be our W ′1, and the set Q mentioned in Condition 6.2 must be a superset
of Γ. We will take Q to be the set of all probability distributions absolutely continuous
relative to PW ∗0 ; note that each Q ∈ Q then has a density q; we let Qdens be the set of all
densities corresponding to Q. By our requirement that D(PW1‖PW ∗0 ) < ∞ for all W1 ∈ W ′1,
we then have that W ′1 = Γ ⊂ Q as required. By our definition of Q, Condition 6.2 then
follows from Proposition A.1. from the same paper (Grünwald and Dawid, 2004) (with µ in
the role of PW ∗0 ), and it remains to verify Condition 6.3 and 6.4, which, taken together, in
our notation together amount to the requirements (a) W ′1 is convex, (b1) for every W1 ∈ W ′1,
PW1 has a Bayes act relative to L and (b2) HW ∗0 (PW1) > −∞, and (c) there exists W ∗1 with
HW ∗0 (PW ∗1 ) = supW1∈W ′1 HW ∗0 (PW1) <∞. Now, (a) holds by definition; (b1) holds because L is
a proper scoring rule so the density p of any P is an L-Bayes act for P (see Grünwald and Dawid
(2004) for details); (b2) holds by our assumption that −HW ∗0 (PW1) = D(PW1‖PW ∗0 ) <∞ and
(c) holds because for all W1 ∈ W ′1, HW ∗0 (PW1) = −D(PW1‖PW ∗0 ) ≤ 0.
Theorem 6.3 of Grünwald and Dawid (2004) together with Lemma 4.1 of that same paper
then gives
HW ∗0 (PW ∗1 ) = sup
W∈W ′1
EV∼PW
[
− log pW (V)
pW ∗0 (V)
]
= sup
W∈W ′1
inf
q∈Qdens
EY∼PW
[
− log q(V)
pW ∗0 (V)
]
= inf
q∈Qdens
sup
W∈W ′1
EV∼PW
[
− log q(V)
pW ∗0 (V)
]
= sup
W∈W ′1
EV∼PW
[
− log pW
∗
1
(V)
pW ∗0 (V)
]
, (42)
where, to be more precise, the first equality is immediate from the fact that −HW ∗0 (PW ∗1 ) =
D(PW ∗1 ‖PW ∗0 ) = infW1∈W ′1 D(PW1‖PW ∗0 ) (which we may assume as stated underneath (41).
The second follows because the W ∗0 -logarithmic score is a proper scoring rule, the third is
Theorem 6.3 of Grünwald and Dawid (2004); this Theorem also gives that the infimum must
be achieved by some W ′1 ∈ W ′1, and Lemma 4.1 of that paper then gives that it must be equal
to W ∗1 , which gives the fourth equality.
But, because the first and last terms in (42) must be equal, and using again that HW ∗0 =−D(·‖PW ∗0 ), (42) implies (41), which is what we had to prove.
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Appendix D Proofs that δ-GROW e-variables claimed to be
simple really are simple
All our results will rely on the following proposition, which we state and prove first:
Proposition 5. [stochastic dominance and simple e-variables] Let Θ0 = {0}, let, for
δ > 0, Θ(δ) be defined as in (20) and let bd(Θ(δ)) be the boundary bd(Θ(δ)) = {θ ∈ Θ1 :
d(θ‖Θ0) = δ}. Suppose that minW∈W(bd(Θ(δ)))D(PW ‖P0) is achieved by some W ∗1 (note that
this will automatically be the case if bd(Θ(δ)) is a finite set), so that by Theorem 1, Part 3,
E∗bd(Θ(δ)) = pW ∗1 (Y)/p0(Y). Then the following statements are equivalent:
1.
inf
θ∈Θ(δ)
EY∼Pθ
[
log
pW ∗1 (Y)
p0(Y)
]
= inf
θ∈bd(Θ(δ))
EY∼Pθ
[
log
pW ∗1 (Y)
p0(Y)
]
. (43)
2. For all W1 ∈ W(Θ(δ)), we have D(PW1‖P0) ≥ D(PW ∗1 ‖P0).
3. We have E∗Θ(δ) = E
∗
bd(Θ(δ)) which, if Θ0 and Θ1 are as above (21), is equivalent to (21).
Furthermore, suppose that there exist a function t, a random variable T = t(Y) (whose density
under θ we denote by p′θ), a θ
∗ ∈ bd(Θ(δ)) and a strictly increasing function f such that
log pW ∗1 (Y)/p0(Y) = log p
′
θ∗(t(Y))/p
′
0(t(Y)) = f(t(Y)) and such that for all θ ∈ Θ(δ) \
bd(Θ(δ)), Pθ[T ], the distribution of T under Pθ, first-order stochastically dominates Pθ∗ [T ]
(i.e. for all t, Fθ(t) ≤ Fθ∗(t) where Fθ is the distribution function of Pθ[T ]). Then (43) holds.
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2) We first note that the conditions of the proposition imply that for all θ ∈
bd(Θ(δ)),
EY∼Pθ
[
log
pW ∗1 (Y)
p0(Y)
]
≥ EY∼PW∗1
[
log
pW ∗1 (Y)
p0(Y)
]
= D(PW ∗1 ‖P0), (44)
as is immediate from Theorem 1, Part 3, which gives that PW ∗1 is the information projection
on the set W ′1 = W(bd(Θ(δ))). Now, fix any W1 ∈ W(Θ(δ)) and consider the function
f(α) = D((1 − α)PW ∗1 + αPW1‖P0) on α ∈ [0, 1]. Straightforward differentiation gives the
following: the second derivative of f is nonnegative, so f is convex on [0, 1]. The first derivative
of f(α) at α = 0 is given by
EY∼PW1
[
log
pW ∗1 (Y)
p0(Y)
]
−EY∼PW∗1
[
log
pW ∗1 (Y)
p0(Y)
]
≥
EY∼PW1
[
log
pW ∗1 (Y)
p0(Y)
]
− inf
θ∈bd(Θ(δ))
EY∼Pθ
[
log
pW ∗1 (Y)
p0(Y)
]
, (45)
where the first expression is just differentiation and the inequality follows from (44). So, if we
can show that, no matter how W1 was chosen, the right-hand side of (45) is nonnegative, we
must have f(1) ≥ f(0) and the desired result follows. But nonnegativity of (45) follows by
the premise (43) and linearity of expectation.
(2) ⇒ (3) Since infW1∈W(Θ(δ)),W0∈W(Θ0)D(PW1‖P0) = D(PW ∗1 ‖P0) we can apply Theo-
rem 1, Part 3, which gives the required result.
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(3)⇒ (1) is immediate using the definitions of E∗Θ(δ) and E∗bd(Θ(δ))
For the second part, note that, by a general property of stochastic dominance (Pomatto
et al., 2020) we have for arbitrary distributions P [T ]: if P [T ] stochastically dominates Pθ∗ [T ],
then we must also have EP [T ][f(T )] ≥ EPθ∗ [f(T )]. This immediately implies the result.
Proofs that δ-GROW e-variables claimed to be simple are simple We need to show
this for four cases mentioned in the main text. In all these cases we show this by establishing
the existence of a statistic T as needed to apply the second part of Proposition 5.
1. One-Sided Exponential Families (Section 4.1) In this case bd(Θ(δ)) is a singleton, so
W ∗1 is the degenerate distribution putting all mass on δ. We take T = t(Y) to be the sufficient
statistic for the family at the given sample size. That is, we re-represent our exponential
family in the canonical parameterization, and let βδ be the canonical parameter corresponding
to δ > 0; we can choose the parameterization such that β0 = 0. With T = t(Y) the sufficient
statistic, we then have log pδ(Y)/p0(Y) = βδt(Y) + log(Z(0)/Z(βδ)) = f(t(Y)); here Z(·) is
the normalization function. Since βδ is strictly increasing with δ (another general property of
exponential families) and β0 = 0, we have that f(T ) is increasing in T . It thus remains to show
that P [T ]δ stochastically dominates P
[T ]
δ for δ > δ. But this is immediate by basic rewriting,
giving Fβ(t) =
∫ t
−∞ exp(βt)dP
[T ]
0 (t)/
∫∞
−∞ exp(βt)dP
[T ]
0 , and then taking derivatives.
2. Two-Sided Normal Location Family (Section 4.1) We take T = µˆ2, the square of the
empirical mean. The result then follows by reasoning similarly to 4. below but is easier, hence
we omit details.
3. One-Sided normal with unknown variance (Section 4.3) Note first thatE∗δ = p
′
δ(V)/p
′
0(V).
Thus, by expressing e-variables in terms of V we can re-represent the problem as having a
simple H0 so that we can use Proposition 5. We take T = ts(Y) to be the Student’s T -
statistic. Straightforward rewriting gives that, for δ¯ > 0, for all σ, pδ(V)/p0(V) = f(T ) for
some increasing function f of T . We thus need to show that the distribution of T under P [T ]δ
is stochastically dominated by its distribution under P [T ]δ′ , for δ
′ > δ. But these are just two
noncentral t-distributions with ν := n − 1 degrees of freedom and noncentrality parameter
µ =
√
nδ vs. µ =
√
nδ′ respectively. Since a noncentral t distribution with parameters (ν, µ)
can be viewed as the distribution of (Z + µ)/
√
V/ν where Z is standard normal and V is an
independent χ2 random variable, stochastic dominance is immediate from the fact that δ > 0.
4. Two-sided normal with unknown variance (Section 4.3) This case is similar to the
previous one but now we take T = (ts(Y))2 to be the absolute value of Student’s t-statistic
ts(Y). Symmetry considerations dictate that E∗δ = ((1/2)p
′
−δ(V) + (1/2)p
′
δ(V))/p
′
0(V). It
is easy to verify that this quantity only depends on T and is strictly increasing in T . Again
by symmetry, the distribution of T under Pδ[T ] is the same as its distribution under P−δ[T ]
and then also the same as its distribution under P(1/2)δ−(1/2)δ[T ]. It thus suffices to show that
Pδ[T ] is stochastically dominated by Pδ′ [T ] for δ′ > δ > 0. But the distribution of T under
Pδ is now the ratio of two independent χ2 distributions, a noncentral χ2 with one degree of
freedom and noncentrality δ and a central χ2 with n−1 degrees of freedom. By independence,
it is sufficient to prove that noncentral χ2’s with one degree of freedom and noncentrality
δ′ > δ dominates a noncentral χ2 with one degree of freedom and noncentrality δ. But this is
straightforward by differentiating the cumulative distribution functions.
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Relating E◦Θ(δ) and E
∗
Θ(δ) in the two-sided case We have, on all samples, logE
◦
Θ(δ) ≥
max{log(1/2)E∗δ , log(1/2)E∗−δ}, so that
inf
θ:|θ|≥δ
EY∼Pθ [logE
◦
Θ(δ)] ≥ inf
θ:|θ|≥δ
max{EY∼Pθ [log
1
2
E∗δ ],EY∼Pθ [log
1
2
E∗−δ]} ≥
max{ inf
θ:|θ|≥δ
EY∼Pθ [log
1
2
E∗δ ], inf
θ:|θ|≥δ
EY∼Pθ [log
1
2
E∗−δ]} ≥
max{ inf
θ:θ≥δ
EY∼Pθ [log
1
2
E∗δ ], inf
θ:θ≤−δ
EY∼Pθ [log
1
2
E∗−δ]} =
max{EY∼Pδ [log
1
2
E∗δ ],EY∼P−δ [log
1
2
E∗−δ]}, (46)
where the final equality is just condition (43) of the proposition above again for the one-sided
case, which above we already showed to hold for 1-dimensional exponential families. On the
other hand, letting Wδ be the prior that puts mass 1/2 on δ and 1/2 on −δ, we have:
inf
θ:|θ|≥δ
EY∼Pθ [logE
∗
Θ(δ)] ≤ Eθ∼WδEY∼Pθ [logE∗Θ(δ)] ≤
Eθ∼WδEY∼Pθ
[
log
PWδ(Y)
P0(Y)
]
= Eθ∼WδEY∼Pθ
[
logE◦Θ(δ)
]
=
1
2
Eδ[log
1
2
E∗δ ] +
1
2
E−δ[log
1
2
E∗−δ] + n ≤
max{EY∼Pδ [log
1
2
E∗δ ],EY∼P−δ [log
1
2
E∗−δ] + n, (47)
where the first inequality is linearity of expectation and the second inequality follows because,
since E∗Θ(δ) is an e-variable relative to {P0}, we can set q := E∗Θ(δ) ·p0; then
∫
q(Y) dλ ≤ 1 and
E∗Θ(δ) = q(Y)/p0(Y), and the inequality follows by the information inequality of information
theory. n above is defined as:
n =
1
2
·
(
Eδ[logE
◦
Θ(δ) − log
1
2
E∗δ ] +E−δ[logE
◦
Θ(δ) − log
1
2
E∗−δ]
)
= log 2 +
1
2
·
(
Eδ[logE
◦
Θ(δ)/E
∗
δ ] +E−δ[logE
◦
Θ(δ)/E
∗
−δ]
)
= log 2− 1
2
(
D(Pδ(Y)‖PWδ(Y)) +D(P−δ(Y)‖PWδ(Y))
)
.
Together, (46) and (47) show that E◦Θ(δ) is an e-variable whose worst-case growth rate is
always within n ≤ log 2 (‘1 bit’) of that of the minimax optimal E∗Θ(δ); moreover, for fixed
δ, n quickly converges to 0, since, for θ ∈ {δ,−δ}, if Y ∼ Pθ, then with high probability,
P−θ/Pθ will be exponentially small in n, so that D(Pθ(Y)‖PWδ(Y)) ≈ − log(1/2) = log 2.
Appendix E Proofs and Details for Section 4.3
We first walk through the claims made in Section 4.3. The first claim is that under all P0,σ
with σ > 0, V has the same distribution, say P0, and under all PW [δ],σ with σ > 0, V has the
same distribution, say PW [δ](V). To show this, it is sufficient to prove that for all σ, all δ ∈ R,
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under all Pδ,σ, the distribution of V only depends on δ but not on σ. But this follows easily:
for i ∈ 1..n, we define Y ′i = Yi/σ. Then Y ′i is ∼ N(δ, 1). But we can write V as a function of
(Y ′1 , . . . , Y ′n), hence the distribution of V does not depend on σ either (note that at this stage,
symmetry of the prior is not yet required).
(29) (we only need to show the first equality) is straightforward to show: one first notes
that, for every c > 0,∫
σ p¯W [δ],σ(Y/c)w
H(σ) dσ∫
σ p0,σ(Y/c)w
H(σ) dσ
=
∫
σ p¯W [δ],σ(Y)w
H(σ) dσ∫
σ p0,σ(Y)w
H(σ) dσ
,
which follows easily by changing the domain of integration in the leftmost expression in both
numerator and denominator from σ to cσ and noting that this incurs the same factor cn in
both numerator and denominator, which therefore cancels. Since we assume Y1 6= 0, the first
equality in (29) now follows by setting c := Y1.
Proof of Theorem 3 Part 1. For 0 < a < b < ∞, denote by W[a,b] the restricted Haar
prior, i.e. the probability distribution on σ with density
w[a,b](σ) :=
{
1
σ · 1log b/a if σ ∈ [a, b],
0 otherwise.
For notational convenience we abbreviate the joint distribution of σ and Y for effect size prior
W [δ] and restricted Haar prior W[a,b] on σ to PW [δ],[a,b] := PW [δ],W[a,b][σ]. The Bayes factor for
effect size prior W [δ] vs. effect size 0 at sample size n based on using the restricted Haar prior
W[a,b] in both H1 and H0 and data Y will be denoted as
B[a,b](Y) =
∫
σ∈[a,b] p¯W [δ],σ(Y)w[a,b](σ) dσ∫
σ∈[a,b] p0,σ(Y)w[a,b](σ) dσ
.
The Bayes factor based on the right Haar prior can then be written as B[0,∞](Y). From (29),
we have for all σ > 0 that
D
(
P
[V]
W [δ]‖P
[V]
0
)
= EV∼PW [δ]
[
p′W [δ](V)
p′0(V)
]
= EY∼PW [δ],σ
[
logB[0,∞](Y)
]
. (48)
Since V is a coarsening of Y, by the information inequality (Cover and Thomas, 1991), we
must also have, for all priors W [σ],W [σ′]:
D
(
PW [δ],W ′[σ]‖P0,W [σ]
) ≥ D (P [V]W [δ],W ′[σ]‖P [V]0,W [σ]) = D (P [V]W [δ]‖P [V]0 ) , (49)
where we also used that the marginal distributions on V do not depend on σ. Combining (48)
and (49), we find that it suffices to prove the following lemma, which is done further below.
Lemma 2. For all W [δ] satisfying the condition of Theorem 3, for all σ > 0, we have:
lim
i→∞
D
(
PW [δ],[1/i,i]‖P0,[1/i,i]
)
= EY∼PW [δ],σ
[
logB[0,∞](Y)
]
. (50)
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Part 2. Fix W[δ] as in the theorem statement, and any corresponding W ′1 as above. We
have:
inf
W [δ]∈W[δ]
D
(
P
[V]
W [δ]‖P
[V]
0
)
≤ inf
W∈W ′1
inf
W [σ]∈W[Γ]
D(PW ‖P0,W [σ])
≤ inf
W [δ]∈W[δ]
inf
W [σ]∈W[Γ]
D(PW [δ],W [σ]‖P0,W [σ]) = inf
W [δ]∈W[δ]
D
(
P
[V]
W [δ]‖P
[V]
0
)
. (51)
Here the first inequality is based on (49), the second is immediate and the third follows by
noting that, by Part 1, for any fixed W [δ] ∈ W[δ], we have
inf
W [σ]∈W[Γ]
D(PW [δ],W [σ]‖P0,W [σ]) = D
(
P
[V]
W [δ]‖P
[V]
0
)
.
But (51) is equivalent to the desired result.
E.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Define random variables U¯ :=
√
n−1
∑
Y 2i , Y¯ := n
−1∑Yi and T := Y¯/U¯ ∈ [−1, 1] is an
invariant, i.e. a function of V. We will sometimes express U¯ and T as functions of Y and
freely write U¯(Y), T (Y) when this notation is more convenient.
The Bayes factor B[a,b](Y) depends on Y only through the functions U¯(Y) and T (Y). We
will therefore also write it, whenever convenient, as a function of these random variables, and
denote it as B[a,b](U¯ , T ).
The proof will combine the following two (sub-) lemmas, whose proof is deferred to further
below. The first lemma allows us to conclude that, when restricted to events of small (marginal)
probability, the expectation of the log Bayes factor is also small.
The second lemma allows us to conclude that, as i → ∞, the expected log Bayes factor
uniformly converges on y ∈ Ai, where Ai is a set that itself grows towards Rn. Thus, while
uniform convergence for all y ∈ Rn is too much to ask for, remarkably we do get uniform
convergence on a ‘noncompact’ sequence of sets: the sets Ai are not included in any compact
set.
Lemma 3. [Uniform Integrability-Flavored Lemma] Let A be a measurable subset of
Rn. We have for all 0 < a < b <∞, W [δ] as in the theorem statement, that:
EY∼PW [δ],[a,b]
[
1{Y∈A} ·
(− logB[0,∞](Y))] ≤ PW [δ],[a,b](Y ∈ A) log 1PW [δ],[a,b](Y ∈ A) (52)
Suppose further that Eδ∼W [δ][|δ|2+] <∞ for some  > 0. Then
EY∼PW [δ],[a,b]
[
1{Y∈A} · logB[a,b](Y)
] ≤ PW [δ],[a,b](Y ∈ A)/(1−) · C (53)
were C is a constant depending on W [δ], n (but not on a, b).
Lemma 4. [Uniform Convergence Beyond Compactness] Let ((ai, bi, ci, c¯i))i∈N be a
sequence of numbers in R+ such that for all i, ci > 1 and c¯i < 1, ciai < c¯ibi (hence also ai < bi),
and limi→∞ ai = 0, limi→∞ bi = ∞, limi→∞ ci = ∞, limi→∞ c¯i = 0, lim(c¯ibi − ciai) = ∞ (For
example, take ai = 1/i, bi = i, ci = log(i+ 1), c¯i = 1/ log(i+ 1)). Then:
lim sup
i→∞
sup
t∈[−1,1],u¯∈[aici,bic¯i]
(
logB[ai,bi](u¯, t)− logB[0,∞](u¯, t)
)
= 0.
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The proof of Lemma 4 is itself based on another key observation, which is an immediate
consequence of the fact that W[a,b] is proportional to the Haar measure on [a, b]:
Proposition 6. [Change-of-Variables] We have for all u¯ > 0, all t ∈ [−1, 1], B[a,b](u¯, t) =
B[a/u¯,b/u¯](1, t).
We now first show how the two lemmas imply the main result. Take any sequence
(ai, bi, ci, c¯i) satisfying the requirements of Lemma 4. Let
Ai = {Y ∈ Rn : ciai ≤ U¯(Y) ≤ c¯ibi}.
and let A¯i ⊂ Rn be its complement. We have
EY∼PW [δ],[ai,bi]
[
logB[ai,bi](Y)− logB[0,∞](Y)
]
= f(i) + g(i),
where
f(i) = EY∼PW [δ],[ai,bi]
[
1{Y∈Ai} · log
B[ai,bi](Y)
B[0,∞](Y)
]
,
g(i) = EY∼PW [δ],[ai,bi]
[
1{Y∈A¯i} · log
B[ai,bi](Y)
B[0,∞](Y)
]
.
Now, take ai = 1/i, bi = i, ci = log(i+ 1), c¯i = 1/ log(i+ 1). We already indicated in Lemma 4
that this choice allows us to apply Lemma 4 to f(i), which will therefore converge to 0 as
i→∞. It thus remains to show that g(i)→ 0. By Lemma 3 we have g(i) = o(PW [δ],[ai,bi](Y ∈
A¯i)). It thus suffices to show that PW [δ],[ai,bi](Y ∈ A¯i)→ 0. For this, note that we can write:
PW [δ],[ai,bi](Y ∈ A¯i) = Eσ∼W[ai,bi]EY∼PW [δ],1
[
1{(σY1,...,σYn)∈A¯i}
]
= Eσ∼W[ai,bi]EY∼PW [δ],1
[
1{σU¯(Y)<ciai∨σU¯(Y)>c¯ibi}
]
≤W[ai,bi](σ < ciai ∨ σ > c¯ibi) +Eσ∼W[ai,bi]
[
1{ciai<σ<c¯ibi} ·EY∼PW [δ],1
[
1{σU¯(Y)<ciai∨σU¯(Y)>c¯ibi}
]]
= W[ai,bi](σ < ciai) +W[ai,bi](σ > c¯ibi) + PW [δ],1(U¯ < ciai) + PW [δ],1(U¯ > c¯ibi),
where we used the union bound. Now, by our choice of (ai, bi, ci, c¯i), the first two probabilities
go to 0 as i→∞. And, since aici → 0 and c¯ibi →∞ and U¯ has a fixed distribution which has
no mass at U¯ ≤ 0 (to be precise, nU¯2 has a noncentral χ2 distribution), the third and fourth
term go to 0 as well. The result is proved.
Remaining Proofs underlying Lemma 2
Proof. (of Proposition 6) Changing the integration variable from σ to ρ := σ/u, we have:
B[a,b](u, t) =
∫
δ
∫ σ=b
σ=a
1
σe
n·(− 1
2
δ2+δut/σ− 1
2
u2/σ2) dσ dW [δ]∫ b
a
1
σe
−(n/2)·u2/σ2 dσ
=
∫
δ
∫ ρ=b/u
ρ=a/u
1
uρe
n·(− 1
2
δ2+δut/(uρ)− 1
2
u2/(u2ρ2))
(
dσ
dρ
)
dρ dW [δ]∫ ρ=b/u
ρ=a/u
1
uρe
−(n/2)·u2/(u2ρ2)
(
dσ
dρ
)
dρ
,
and the result follows by rewriting.
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Proof. (of Lemma 3) Part 2. Let W[a,b] | y be the posterior distribution on (δ, σ) based
on prior W [δ] × W[a,b]. By straightforward rewriting we can re-express 1/B[a,b](y) as an
expectation over the posterior W[a,b] | y. We do this in the second step below, and then
continue using Jensen’s inequality:
logB[a,b](y) = − log
∫
δ
∫
σ∈[a,b] e
−n(y¯2/2σ2+δ2/2−δ·y¯/σ)+n(δ2/2−δ·y¯/σ) dσ dW [δ]
e−n(y¯2/2σ2+δ2/2−δ·y¯/σ) dσ dW [δ]
= − logE(δ,σ)∼W[a,b]|y
[
en·(
1
2
δ2−δy¯/σ)
]
≤ −1
2
· nδ2 + 1
2
n ·E(δ,σ)∼W[a,b]|y [y¯ · δ/σ] ≤
1
2
n ·E(δ,σ)∼W[a,b]|y [|y¯| · |δ|/σ] .
We thus have, by Hölder’s inequality, for q, r > 1 with 1/r + 1/q = 1:
EY
[
1{Y∈A} · logB[a,b](Y,W [δ])
] ≤ (EY [1q{Y∈A}])1/q · (EY (E(δ,σ)∼W[a,b]|Y [(n/2)|Y¯||δ|/σ])r)1/r
≤ P (Y ∈ A)1/q · (n/2) ·
(
EYE(δ,σ)∼W[a,b]|Y
(|Y¯||δ|/σ)r)1/r ,
where in the final line we once again used Jensen. The expectation can be rewritten as:
EYE(δ,σ)∼Wa,b|Y
(|Y¯||δ|/σ)r = Eδ∼W [δ],σ∼W[a,b]EY1,...,Yn i.i.d.∼Pδ,σ (|Y¯||δ|/σ)r
= Eδ∼W [δ]Eσ∼W[a,b]EY′∼N(δ/n,1/n)
(|Y′||δ|)r
= n−rEδ∼W [δ]|δ|rEY′∼N(δ,1)|Y′|r
≤ 2rn−rEδ∼W [δ]|δ|rEY′∼N(1,δ)[(|Y′ − δ|+ |δ|)r]
≤ 2rn−rEδ∼W [δ]
[|δ|2r + |δ|rCr] ,
where we used that |a + b|r ≤ (2 max{|a|, |b|})r ≤ 2r(|a|r + |b|r) and that, if Y ∼ N0,1, then
E[|Y|r] ≤ Cr for a constant Cr that does not depend on δ. The result follows.
Part 1. Recall that V denotes the maximal invariant. Its marginal distribution does not
depend on σ, so for any 0 < a′ < b′ we can write:
EY∼PW [δ],[a,b]
[
1{Y∈A} ·
(− logB[0,∞](Y))] =
EY∼PW [δ],[a,b]
[
1{Y∈A} ·
(
log
p[a,b],0(V(Y))
pW [δ],[a,b](V(Y))
)]
=
PW [δ],[a,b](Y ∈ A) ·EY∼PW [δ],[a,b]|Y∈A
[
log
p[a,b],0(V(Y) | Y ∈ A)
pW [δ],[a,b](V(Y) | Y ∈ A)
+ log
P[a,b],0(Y ∈ A)
PW [δ],[a,b](Y ∈ A)
]
≤
PW [δ],[a,b](Y ∈ A) ·
(
logP[a,b],0(Y ∈ A)− logPW [δ],[a,b](Y ∈ A)
) ≤
− PW [δ],[a,b](Y ∈ A) logPW [δ],[a,b](Y ∈ A)
where we used Jensen’s inequality.
Proof. (of Lemma 4) Using Proposition 6 and its consequence that B[0,∞] depends on the
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invariant only, i.e. for all u¯ > 0, B[0,∞](u¯, t) = B[0,∞](1, t), we can rewrite the supremum as
sup
t∈[−1,1], u¯∈[aici,bic¯i]
(
logB[ai/u¯,bi/u¯](1, t)− logB[0,∞](1, t)
) ≤
sup
t∈[−1,1], 0<c<1/ci, c′>1/c¯i
(
logB[c,c′](1, t)− logB[0,∞](1, t)
) ≤
sup
0<c<1/ci, c
′>1/c¯i
(
log
∫ ∞
0
1
σ
e−(n/2)σ
−2
dσ − log
∫ c′
c
1
σ
e−(n/2)σ
−2
dσ
)
≤(
log
∫ ∞
0
1
σ
e−(n/2)σ
−2
dσ − log
∫ 1/c¯i
1/ci
1
σ
e−(n/2)σ
−2
dσ
)
= f(ci, c¯i)
for some function f(c, c¯) with limc→∞,c¯↓0 f(c, c¯) = 0 (note that the dependence on t has
disappeared); the result follows. Here we used that, for general u, t, 0 < a < b,
logB[a,b](u, t)− logB[0,∞](u, t) =
log
∫
δ
∫ b
σ=a
1
σe
n·(− 1
2
δ2+δut/σ− 1
2
u2/σ2) dσ dW [δ]∫ b
a
1
σe
−(n/2)·u2/σ2 dσ
− log
∫
δ
∫∞
σ=0
1
σe
n·(− 1
2
δ2+δut/σ− 1
2
u2/σ2) dσ dW [σ]∫∞
0
1
σe
−(n/2)·u2/σ2 dσ
≤
log
∫ ∞
0
1
σ
e−(n/2)·u
2/σ2 dσ − log
∫ b
a
1
σ
e−(n/2)·u
2/σ2 dσ.
E.2 Why W ∗1 and W ∗0 are achieved and have finite support in Section 4.5
The minima are achieved because of the joint lower-semi-continuity of KL divergence (Posner,
1975). To see that the supports are finite, note the following: for given sample size n, the
probability distribution PW is completely determined by the probabilities assigned to the
sufficient statistics N1|a, N1|b. This means that for each priorW ∈ W(Θ1), the Bayes marginal
PW can be identified with a vector of Mn := (na + 1) · (nb + 1) real-valued components. Every
such PW can also be written as a mixture of Pθ’s for θ = (µa|1, µb|1) ∈ Θ1, a convex set. By
Carathéodory’s theorem we need at most Mn components to describe an arbitrary PW .
Appendix F Motivation for use of KL to define GROW sets
If there is more than a single parameter of interest, then a natural (but certainly not the
only reasonable!) divergence measure to use in (20) is to set d equal to the KL divergence
D(θ1‖Θ0) := infθ0∈Θ0 D(θ1‖θ0).
To see why, note that  indicates the easiness of testing Θ() vs. Θ0: the larger , the
‘further’ Θ() from Θ0 and the larger the value of gr(). The KL divergence is the only
divergence measure in which ‘easiness’ of testing Θ() is consistent with easiness of testing
individual elements of Θ1. By this we mean the following: suppose there exist θ1, θ′1 ∈ Θ1
with θ1 6= θ′1 achieving equal growth rates gr({θ′1}) = gr({θ1}) in the tests of the individual
point hypotheses {θ1} vs Θ0 and {θ′1} vs. Θ0 Then if d is not the KL it can happen that, for
some  > 0, θ1 ∈ Θ() yet θ′2 6∈ Θ(). With d equal to KL this is impossible. This follows
immediately from Theorem 1, Part 1, which tells us D(θ1‖Θ0) = gr({θ1}).
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